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ALUMNI LIBRARY, THEOI,pGieAL SEMINARY,

PRINCETON, N. J.

., BT 1101 .L44 1818 v. 2

Leland, John, 1691-1766. -^'^^^'^J . . . The advantage and Bool necessity of the Christian

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THE

ADVANTAGE AND NECESSITY

OF THE

CHRISTIAN REVELATION,

SHEWN FROM THE

STATE OF RELIGION

IN" THE

ANTIENT HEATHEX WORLD:

ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE KNOWLEDGE AND WORSHIP OF TH^

ONE TRUE GOD: A RULE OF MORAL DUl'Y: AND A SI' ATE

OF FUTURE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

A Preliminary Discourse on JSTcitural and Mevealed Religion^

IN TWO VOLUMES. BY JOHN LELAND, D. D.

AUTHOR OF THE VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS, Ssc

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VOLUME XL

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY ANTHONY FTNLEY,

AT THE N. E. CORNER OF CHESNUT AND FOURTH STREEt^,-

William Fry, Printer,

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PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND VOLUME.

Although in the general preface prefixed to the for- mer volume, I have given an account of the nature and de- sign of this work, yet I think it not amiss to say something farther iii the beginning of this volume, for removing or ob- viating some prejudices, which might be conceived against the plan I have formed, and the manner in which it is exe- cuted.

Some learned persons seem not willing to admit, that the main principles of religion and morality were originally communicated by Divine Revelation to the first parents of mankind, and from them conveyed by tradition to their pos- terity. They think it more probable, that they were led by their own natural sense and reason to the knowledge of those pAiciples. I readily own, that those principles, when once discovered, will be found upon examination to be perfectly agreeable to the best reason of mankind; but I think enough is offered in this treatise to shew, that in fact the first notices of these things were communicated to the first ancestors of the human race by a revelation from God. And in this I have the satisfaction of agreeing with many eminent divine^, and with those two great masters of reason, and. who are justly reckoned among our best writers on the law of nature,

iv PREFACE.

Grotius and PufFendorff. The supposing the knowledge of the main principles of religion to have been originally- owing to a Divine Revelation, docs not at all deny that those principles are really founded in the nature of things, and confirmed by the dictates of pure and unprejudiced reason. These things are perfectly consistent; and when taken toge- ther, give one a more extensive view of the wisdom and goodness of God in his dispensations towards mankind, and the various ways that have been taken for leading men into the knowledge of religion and morals. That this is most agreeable to the Mosaic accounts, is sufficiently shewn both in the former volume and in this. Ana that there were very ^ntient traditions among the Heathen nations, concerning some of the main principles of religion, though in process of time grccttly depraved and corrupted, appears from the accounts that are given us by the Heathen writers them- selves.

But there is another objection which I have met with, and which deserves to be more particularly considered. It is this, That the making such a representation as I have done, of the state of the Pagan world, may possibly be turn- ed to the disadvantage of natural religion itself, and may tend to the weakening those principles which lie at the foun- dation of all religion and morality.

If by natural religion be meant religion as it is founded %n nature, and which may be proved to be agreeable to the best and soundest principles of human reason, there is no- thing in this work that can bring any real prejudice to it. And though I am far from thinking that the Gospel is mere- ly a republication of the law of nature, yet this may be safe- ly affirmed, and is what I have endeavoured in the course oi this work to shew, that it is one excellent design of the Chriscian Revelation to confirm and establish it, to place it |n the properest light, and to clear it from that amazing load of rubbish which had been heaped upon it in a long succes-

PREFACE. y

sion of ages. Nowhere is natural religion, taken in the sense I have mentioned, so well understood, so clearly ex- plained, and so strongly asserted, as where the Christian Religion is duly entertained and professed.

But if by natural religion be understood religion as it stands merely on the foot of the powers of unassisted rea- son, entirely independent on Divine Revelation, and as it was actually taught and professed by those who made the high- €st pretences to reason and religion in the Pagan world, I confess it has been one principal part of my design in this work to shew its weaknesses and defects. And as a high admiration of the antient philosophers, especially those who flourished in the celebrated nations of Greece and Rome, has inspired many with a contempt of the Holy Scriptures, and caused them to entertain mean and undervaluing thoughts of the Gospel of Christ, I cannot but think it a real service to religion, to shew how unfit those boasted lights of the Pagan world were to be the guides of mankind; and that they fell vastly short of the first teachers and publishers of Christianity, mean and illiterate as some have esteemed them.

The Scriptures make the most striking representations of the darkness and corruptions of the Heathen world. And the antient apologists for Christianity give the same account of the state of the Pagan nations. They set themselves to expose their gross idolatry and polytheism, the impurities and abominations of their religion and worship, their great corruption and dissoluteness of morals, and the uncertain- ties and contradictions of their best writers, and thence ar- gue the great usefulness and necessity of the Christian Re- velation, and the advantage it was of to mankind. And who- ever would have a just and full view of the inestimable be- nefits and privileges we are made partakers of by the Gospel, ought by no means to lose sight of this. ^

It is not the intention of any thing that is said in this book to degrade and vilify human reason, as if it were of

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vi PREFACE.

no use in religion, and only fit to lead men astray. I ana fully persuaded that reason, duly exercised and improved, is very friendly to religion and morals: and that the main principles of the Christian Religion, if set before men in a proper light, will approve themselves to right reason, when freed from vicious and sinful prejudices* it is by reason that we are enabled to detect false revelations, and to dis- cern the proofs and evidences of the true, and the glorious characters of wisdom and goodness, of purity and truth, which shine in it Bat I confess I am far from conceiving so high an opinion of reason, if left merely to itself in the present state of mankind, as some have entertained of it. I am fully convinced by arguments drawn from undeniable fact and experience, that reason, when puffed up with a pre- sumptuous conceit of its own ability and strength, and ne- glecting or despising proper assistances, or when boldly in- truding into things too high for it, or led aside by corrupt custom and mere human authority, by vicious prejudices and passions and carnal interests, is often apt to pass very- wrong judgments on things, especially in divine matters. Nor do I apprehend, that it is any disparagement to reason, to lay open the faults and errors of those who have made the greatest pretensions to it, or that it follows from this, that reason is a vain thing, and has no certain foundations to rely upon. Thus, e. g. if some that have professed to go- vern themselves by reason, have entertained very wrong no- tions of God, of his perfections, attributes, and providence, it by no means follows, that the proofs of the divine nature and perfections, or of God's governing providence, are not built upon sure and solid grounds, or that reason is not able to discern the force of those proofs, when clearly set before it. In like manner with regard to morals, it would be wrong to conclude that there is no certainty in any moral principles, because some persons of great name have passed very false judgments in matters which appear to be of great impor-

PREFACE. yii

tance in morality: or that there is nothing base or deformed in vicious actions or affections, because in some nations and ages, and in the opinion of persons pretending to superior wisdom, they have been regarded as matters of indifferency, and as either no faults at all, or very slight ones.

In the course of this work, especially in that part of it which relates to the state of morality in the Heathen world, I have been under a necessity of taking notice of several things which can scarce be mentioned without being offen- sive to virtuous minds, though frequently practised among those that have passed for the most learned and polite of the Heathen nations, and even by many of the philosophers themselves. The subject was so disagreeable to me, that I intended more than once to have passed it over altogether, or to have mentioned it very slightly, and only in a general way. But what determined me to insist upon a full proof was, that otherwise the charge might have been looked upon to be groundless and calumnious. And not only have some real friends to Christianity attempted to clear them from it, but others of a different character have taken occasion to censure the apostle Paul, as having made an unjust and odi- ous representation of the state of the Gentile world, beyond what can be justified by truth and fact. The proofs I have brought are from the antient Heathen writers themselves, and not from any Christian authors, except as far as they are supported by the former. Nor can I think there is any danger of what some good persons might possibly be appre- hensive of, that this might tend to diminish the horror of vices, which are justly accounted most detestable and odi- ous. The only inference that can justly be drawn from it is, that the bias of corrupt customs, and vicious appetites and passions, are apt to over-rule the moral sentiments of the human mind, and tend to stifle the remonstrances of con- science, and even to bribe reason to judge too favourably concerning practices which it would otherwise reject with

VUl

MEFACE.

abhorrence. It also shews, that a Divine Revelation, and art express law of God, enforced by the strongest sanctions, may be of great use in point of morals, even with respect to the restraining men from those things, the evil and turpi- tude of which seem to be most apparent to reason and na- ture. Notwithstanding the corruptions that have prevailed among many who have taken upon them the name of Chris- tians, and which some have taken pains to exaggerate, the most abominable vices have been far from being so general among them, as they were in those that have been esteemed the most reiined nations of Paganism. It is not to be doubted, but that vast numbers of those who believe the Gospel have been and are preserved by the purity of its precepts, and the power of its sanctions, from vices to which otherwise thev would have given a boundless indulgence. Nor can any who believe the Christian religion allow themselves in vi- cious practices, without sinning against the clearest light, and breaking through the strongest engagements. I do not see, therefore, how they can be accounted real friends to the puri- ty of morals, who are for taking away or diminishing the force of those motives and sanctions which the Gospel proposes, and which, where they arc really believed, tend both to ani- mate good men to a holy and virtuous practice by the most glorious hopes and prospects, and to deter the wicked from their evil courses by the most amazing denunciations of God's righteous vengeance.

When we consider the strange fluctuations of persons of the greatest abilities in the Pagan world, with respect to several important points of religion and morality, and to the retributions of a future state, it ought surely to make us highly thankful that we have a written well-attested Reve- lation in our hands, to which we may have recourse, both for assisting us to form a right judgment in matters of the greatest consequence, and for regulating our practice. And it has pleased God in his great wisdom and goodness to es-

PREFACE. ix

tablish its divine authority by such an abundance and va- riety of proofs, as are every way suitable to the importance of the case, and are amply sufficient to engage though not to constrain the assent. Christianity is not afraid of the light, or of a free and impartial examination and inquiry. It has always met with the best reception from those who have ex- amined it, in the integrity of their hearts, with that serious- ness and attention which the great importance of it well de- serves. Let us therefore, with minds freed as far as possible from vicious prejudices, consider the nature and excellency of the Christian religion, the spirittiaiiiy and heavenliness of its doctrines, the discoveries that are there rt\ade to us of those things which it is of the highest concernment to us to know, especially relating to the wonderful methods of the Divine Wisdom and Grace for our redemption and salva- tion, the unquestionable excellency of its morals, and purity of its laws, the power of those motives by which the prac- tice of them is enforced, and the admirable tendency of the whole to promote the glory of God, and the cause of right- eousness, piety, and virtue in the world: let us then make proper reflections on the holy and spotless life, and most perfect and sublime character of the great Founder of our religion, and also on the character of his disciples, who pub- lished it to the world in his name: that they appear to have been persons of great probity and simplicity, incapable of carrying on an artful imposture, or of being themselves the inventors of that scheme of religion which they taught, and which was contrary in several instances to their own strong- est prejudices; nor is there any thing in their whole temper and conduct, in the doctrine they preached, or in the manner of propagating it, that savours of the views of worldly poli- cy, or that is cunningly accommodated to humour men's pre- judices and vicious passions, and gratify their a^Tibition and sensuality. But especially let us consider the ilUistrious at- testations given from heaven to the divine mission, both of Vol. II. ' b

X PREFACE.

the first Author and publishers of the Christian religion, by a series of the most wonderful works, done in express con- firmation of the religion they taught, and which manifestly transcended all human power or skill, and bore the evident tokens of a divine interposition: and that the truth of these facts is ascertained to us with all the evidence that can be reasonably desired in such a case, and which, all things con- sidered, is as great as could be expected concerning any facts whatsoever done in past ages. To all this may be added the evidence arising from clear and express prophecies, re- lating to events which no human sagacity could foresee, some of them undeniably delivered and committed to writ- ing many ages before their accomplishment, and yet in due time punctually fulfilled. All these are of great force, even separately considered; but when viewed and taken together in their just connection and harmony, form such a chain of proofs, as carries a mighty force of conviction with it to an honest and unprejudiced mind, that is animated with a sin- cere love of truth. The advocates of Christianity have fre- quently urged these arguments with great clearness and strength; and whilst these proofs continue firm, and the ori- ginal facts are well supported, the truth and divine authority of the Christian religion stand upon solid and immoveable foundations. Nor should we suffer prejudices arising from the ill conduct of many of its professors and teachers, or from some particular passages of Scripture hard to be un- derstood, or the difficulty of comprehending some of its doc- trines which relate to things of a very, sublime and mys- terious nature, at all shake our belief of true original Christianity. It is a rule laid down long since by Aristotle, and the justness of which has never been controverted, that we ought not to expect in all things the same kind of evi- dence, but in every thing content ourselves with such proofs as the nature of the subject will bear. To insist upon mathe- matical demonstration in matters of religion and morality,

PREFACE. xi

is perfectly absurd and unreasonable; and yet the evidence may be such as is sufficient to produce a certainty, though of another kind, and which may very fully satisfy the mind, and make it reasonable for us to give our assent to it, not- withstanding some objections that may be made against it, and from which scarce any truth is entirely free.

I shall on this occasion consider a pretence that has been often made use of by men of sceptical minds, that without an absolute certainty (which they pretend is not to be had in what relates to religion) they may reasonably and safely withhold their assent. But such persons ought to consider that if there be a probability on the side of religion, though short of an absolute certainty, this would induce an obliga- tion upon them to receive it, and to govern their temper and conduct by the rules it prescribes. Where a thing appears to be probable, i. e. that there is more reason for it than the contrary, this does not leave the mind in a perfect equili- brium, and at liberty absolutely to susp'-nd its assent if it be a matter of speculation, or to abstain from acting if it be a matter of practice. This the Pyrrhonists, who carried scep- ticism to the greatest height, were sensible of, and therefore would not allow that anv one thing is more probable than another; which seems to me to be one of the greatest extrava- gancies that any man pretending to reason can be guilty of; nor do I believe that any one man, \\hatever he might pre- tend in words, could really bring himself to think so. Those of what was called the New Academy, though at the bot- tom little better than sceptics, saw the absurdity of this, and therefore though they would not acknowledge a certainty, yet allowed a probability in things; and if they had pur- sued this concession to its genuine consequences, it would have subverted the scheme they had in view of a perpe- tual suspension of assent. It is an undeniable maxim, that we ought to follow evidence as far as it appears to us, and therefore that which is probable ought to sway our

Xii PREFACE.

judgment, and influence our practice, according to the measure of its probability, and the preponderancy of the reasons which are brought for it. It is manifest to every one that has any knowledge of mankind, that it is pro- bability which governs our conduct, if we act prudently; and that the author of our beings designed it should be so. We are so constituted, that in almost all cases rela- ting to practice, we are obliged to follow what appears to us upon a proper consideration of it to be most pro- bable; and for any man wilfully to neglect a thing which would probably be of great advantage to him, or to do any thing ^^hich probably will expose him to great loss and damage, would be justly deemed a very foolish and unreasonable conduct, and in matters where duty is con- cerned a very guilty one. Some of those who were other- wise much addicted to sceptism in speculation, have yet acknowledged, that in the affairs of common life, people ought to follow probable appearances. And if this is to be done in what relates to our present temporal interest and advantage, why not in that which relates to our highest happiness? The more important any affair is, and the greater the danger is in neglecting it, or the damage to be sustained by such a neglect, the more we are obli- ged, by the soundest maxims of reason and good sense, to govern ourselves, and act according to what 'appears to us upon a diligent enquiry to be most probable. And what reason can be assigned, that we should not act so in . matters of the greatest consequence, and in which our everlasting salvation appears to be nearly concerned? In cases of this nature, if the hazard be vastly greater on one side than on the other; all the rules of prudence lead us to take that part, which has the least hazard attending it, even though the evidtnce on that side should be supposed to be no greater, or perhaps something less, than on the other. But when both the evidence is

PREFACE. xiii

much stronger on one side, and at the same time the hazard men run by rejecting it much greater, to take that side which is both less probable and more danger- ous, would be the most foolish and inexcusable conduct in the world.

If therefore, upon a fair enquiry, there is at least a great probability that the Christian Revelation came from God, it is boih our wisdom and duty to embrace it, and to go- vern ourselves by its excellent rules. No man in that case would run a hazard by embracing the Gospel, or at least a hazard in any degree equal to what he would expose himself to by rejecting it: Let us suppose that by com- plying with the terms of salvation which are there pro- posed, he should deny himself some of those liberties which he would otherwise indulge, and controul his passions by the Christian rules, which do not require us to extir- pate the passions and appetites, but to govern and keep them within the bounds of moderation and temperance, this is no more than the wisest men have advised as the properest way for securing a man's own tranquillity, and for preserving body and soul in a right temper. In other cases, men think it reasonable to hazard some present loss, and to undergo some present hardships and inconve- niencies, on the probable prospect of avoiding a much greater evil, or procuring some valuable and superior ad- vantage. But when the advantage proposed is so infinitely great as the rewards promised to good men in the Gos- pel, and the evils so great as the punishments there denounced against the obstinately impenitent and disobedi- ent, it ought certainly to have proportionably a more power- ful influence.

1 hope every reader that brings with him a mind sin- cerely disposed to know the truth and follow it, willjohi with me in earnest supplications to God, who is a lover of truth and holiness, that he would be graciously pleased

Xiv PREFACE.

to clear our minds from vicious prejudices, and dispel the clouds of ignorance and error, that we may receive the truth in the love of it, may behold it in its convinc- ing light, and feel its transforming power, and may bring forth fruits suitable to it in a holy and virtuous life, to the glory of God, and our own eternal salvation.

CONTENTS

OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

Man appears from the frame of his nature to be a moral agent, and designed to be governed by a law. Accordingly, God hath given him a law to be the rule of his duty The scheme of those who pretend that this law is naturally and necessarily known to all men without instruction, contrary to fact and experience. Yet there are several ways by which men come to a knowledge of this law, and of the duty required of them; viz. by a moral sense implanted in the human heart; by a principle of reason judging from the natures and relations of things; by education, and human instruction: besides all which, God hath made discoveries of his will concerning our duty, in a way of extraor- dinary Divine Revelation. Page 1.

CHAPTER n.

The principal heads of moral duty were made known to mankind from the be- ginning, and continued to be known and acknowledged in the patriarchal ages. When men fell from the right knowledge of God, they fell also in important Instances from the right knowledge of moral duty. The law given to the peo- ple of Israel was designed to instruct and direct them in morals, as well as in the knowledge and worship of the one true God. A great deal was done in the methods of Divine Providence, to preserve the sense and knowledge of morals among the heathen nations; but they did not make aright use of the helps afforded them. Page 18.

CHAPTER m.

A particular enquiry into the state of morality in the Heathen world. A com- plete rule of morals, taken in its just extent, comprehends the duties relating to God, our neighbours, and^ourselves. If the Heathens had such a rule among

xvi CONTENTS.

them, it would appear either in the precepts of their reheion, or in the pre- scriptious of theii- ci\il laws, or customs which have the force of laws, or in the doctrines and instiuctions of their philosophers and moralists. It is proposed distinctly to consider each of these. As to what passed among them for reli- gion, morality did not properly make any part of it, nor was it the office of their priests to teach men virtue. .\s to the civil laws and constitutions, supposing them to have been never so proper for civil government, they were not fitted to be an adequate rule of morals. The best of them were, in several respects, greatly defective. Various instances produced of civil laws, and of customs' which had the force of laws, among the most civilized nations, especially an>ong the antient Egyptians and Greeks, which were contrary to the rules of morality. Page 33.

CHAPTER IV.

Farther instances of civil laws and customs among the Pagan nations. Those of the antient Romans considered The laws of the twelve tables, though mighti- ly extolled, were far from exhibiting a complete rule of morals. The law of Romulus concerning the exposing of diseased and deformed children. This continued to be practised among the Romans. Their cruel treatment of their slaves. Their gladiatory shows contrary to humanity. Unnatural lusts common among them as well as the Greeks. Observations on the Chinese laws and customs Other laws and customs of nations mentioned, which are contrary to good morals. Page 57.

CHAPTER V.

Concerning morality as taught by the antient Heathen philosophers. Some of them said excellent things concerning moral virtue, and their writings might in several respects be of great use. But they could not furnish a perfect rule of morals, that had sufficient certainty, clearness, and authority. No one philosopher, or sect of philosophers, can be absolutely depended upon as a proper guide in matters of morality. Nor is a complete system of morals to be extracted from the writings of them all collectively considered. The vanity of such an attempt shewn. Their sentiments, how excellent soever, could not properly pass for laws to mankind. Page 72.

CHAPTER Vr. Many of the philosophers were fundamentally wrong in the first principles of morals. They denied that there are any moral differences of things founded in nature and reason, and resolved them wholly into human laws and customs. Observations on those philosophers wlio made man's chief good consist in plea- sure, and proposed this as the highest end of morals, without any regard to a Divine Law. The moral system of Epicurus considered. His high pretences to virtue e.vamhied. The inconsistency of his principles shewn, and that, if

CONTENTS. xvii

pursued to their genuine consequences, they are really destructive of all virtue and good morals. Page 83.

CHAPTER VIL

The sentiments of those who are accounted the best of the Pagan moral philoso- phers considered. They held in general, that the law is right reason. Bnt reason alone, without a superior authority, does not lay an obliging force upon men. The wisest Heathens taught, that the original of law was from God, and that from him it derived its authority. As to the question, how this law comes to he known to us, they sometimes represent it as naturally known to all men. But the principal way of knowing it is resolved by them into the mind and reasen of wise men, or, in other words, into the doctrines and instructions of the phi- losophers. The uncertainty of this rule of morals shewn. They talked highly of virtue in general, but differed about matters of great importance relating to the law of nature; some instances of which are mentioned. Page 107.

CHAPTER Vni.

Epictetus's observation concerning the difficulty of applying general preconcep- tions to particular cases, verified in the antient pbilosophei's. They Avere gene- rally wrong with respect to the duty and worship proper to be rendex'ed to God, though they themselves acknowledged it to be a point of the highest im- portance. As to social duties, some eminent philosophers pleaded for revenge ^nd, against forgiveness of injuries. But especially they were deficient in that part of moral duty which relates to the government of the sensual appetites and passions. Many of the philosophers countenanced by their principles and pi-actice the most unnatural lusts and vices. Those of them that did not carry it so far, yet encouraged an impurity inconsistent with the strictness and dig- nity of virtue. Plato very culpable in this respect, so also were the Cynics and Stoics. Simple fornication generally allowed amongst them. Our modern deists very loose in their principles with regai^d to sensual impurities. Page 119.

CHAPTER IX.

The Stoics the most eminent teachers of morals in the Pagan world. Mightily admired and extolled both by the antients and moderns. Observations on the Stoical maxims and precepts with regard to piety towards God. Their scheme tended to take away, or very much weaken, the fear of God as a punisher of sin. It tended also to raise men to a state of self-sufficiency and independency, inconsistent with a due veneration for the Supreme Being. Extravagant strains of pride and arrogance in some of the principal Stoics. Concession of sin in their addresses to the Deity made no part of their religion. Page 145.

Vol. II. c

xviii CONTENTS,

CHAPTER X.

The Stoics gave excellent precepts with regard to the duties men owe to one another. Yet they carried their doctrine of apathy so far, as to be in some in- stances not properly consistent with a humane disposition and a charitable sym- pathy. They said fine things concerning forgiving injuries and bearing with other men's faults. But in several respects they carried this to an extreme, and placed it on wrong foundations, or enforced it by improper motives. This is particularly shewn with regard to those two eminent philosophers Epictetus and Marcus Antoninus The most antient Stoics did not allow pardoning mercy to be an ingredient in a perfect character. Page 1G7.

CHAPTER XI.

The Stoical precepts with regard to self-government considered. They talk in high strains of regulating and subduing the appetites and passions; and yet gave too great indulgence to the fleshly concupiscence, and had not a due re- gard to purity and chastity. Their doctrine of suicide considered. Some of tlie most eminent wise men among the Heathens, and many of our modern ad- mirers of natural religion, faulty in this respect. The falsehood and pernicious consequences of this doctrine shewn. Page 187.

CHAPTER Xn.

The Stoics professed to lead men to perfect happiness in this prcsentlife, abstract- ing from all consideration of a future state. Their scheme of the absolute sufficien- cy of virtue to happiness, and the indifFerency of all external things considered. They were sometimes obliged to make concessions which were not very con- sistent with their system. Their philosophy in its rigour not reducible to prac- tice, and had little influence either on the people or on themselves. They did not give a clear idea of the nature of that virtue which they so highly extolled^ The loose doctrine of many of the Stoics, as well as other philosophers, with regard to truth and lying. Page 208,

CHAPTER Xm.

The nations were sunk into a deplorable state of corruption, with regard to morals, at the time of our Saviour's appearing. To recover them from their wretched and guilty stale to holiness and happiness, one principal end for which God sent his Son into the world. The Gospel Dispensation opened with a free offer of pardon and salvation to perishing sinners, upon their returning to God by faith and repentance, and new obediencei at the same time the best directions and assistances were given to engage them to a holy and vir- tuous practice. The Gospel scheme of morality exceeds Avhatsoever had been published to the world before. A summary representation of the excellency «f the Gospel precepts with regard to the dutieis we owe to God, our neigh-

CONTENTS. xix

bours, and ourselves. These precepts enforced by the most powerful and im- portant motives. The tendency of the Gospel to promote the practice of holi- ness and virtue, an argument to prove the Divinity of the Christian Reve- lation. . Page 230.

PART III.

CHAPTER I.

The importance of the doctrine of a future state. Tt is agreeable to right reason. The natural and moral arguments for a future state of great weight. Yet not so evident, but that if men were left merely to their own unassisted reason, they would be apt to labour under great doubt and difficulties. A Revelation from God coucerning it would be of great advantage. Page 266,

CHAPTER n

Some notions of the immortality of the soul and a future state obtained among mankind from the most antient times, and spread very generally through the nations. This was not originally the effect of human reason and philosophy, nor was it merely the invention of legislators for political purposes: but was derived to them by a most antient tradition from the earliest ages, and was probably a part of the primitive religion communicated by Divine Revelation to the first of the human race. Page 272.

CHAPTER HI.

The antient traditions "concerning the immortality of the soul and a future state became in process of time greatly obscured and corrupted. It was absolutely denied by many of the philosophers, and rejected as a vulgar error. Others represented it as altogether uncertain, and having no solid foundation to sup- port it.The various and contradictory sentiments of the philosophers concerning the nature of the human soul. Many of the Peripatetics denied the subsistence of the soul after death, and this seems to have been Aristotle's own opinion. The Stoics had no settled or consistent scheme on this head: nor v,'as the doc- trine of the immortality of the soul a doctrine of their school. A future state not acknowledged by the celebrated Chinese philosopher Confucius, nor by the sect of the learned who profess to be his disciples. Page 283.

CHAPTER IV.

Concerning the philosophers who professed to believe and teach the immortality of the soul. Of these Pythagoras is generally esteemed one of the most emi- nent. His doctrine on this head shewn to be not well consistent with a state of future rewards and punishments. Socrates believed the immortality of the soul, and a future state, and argued for it. In this he was followed by Plato. The

XX CONTENTS.

Doctrine of Cicero with regard to the immortality of the soul considered. As also that of Plutarch. Page 301.

CHAPTER V.

Those of the antient philosophers who argued for the immortality of the soul, placed it on wrong foundations, and mixed things Avith it which weakened the belief of it. Some of them asserted, that the soul is immortal, as being a por- tion of the Divine Essence. They universally held the pre-existence of the hu- man soul, and laid the chief stress upon this for proving its immortality. Their doctrine of the transmigration of souls was a great corruption of the true doc- trine of a future state. Those who said the highest things of future happiness, considered it as confined chiefly to persons of eminence, or to those of philoso- phical minds, and afforded small encouragement to the common kind of pious and virtuous persons. The rewards of Elysium were but temporary, and of a short duration: and even the happiness of those privileged souls, who were supposed to be admitted not merely into Elysium, but into heaven, was not everlasting in the strict and proper sense. The Gospel doctrine of eternal life to all good and righteous piersons was not taught by the antient Pagan philo- sophers. Page 324.

CHAPTER VI.

Those that seemed to be the most strenuous advocates for the immortality of the soul and a future state among the antients, did not pretend to any certainty concerning it. The uncertainty they were under appears from their way of managing their consolatory discourses on the death of their friends.To this also it was owing, that in their exhortations to virtue they laid little stress on the rewards of a future state. Their not having a certainty concerning a future state, put them upon schemes to supply the want of it. Hence they insisted upon the self-sufficiency of virtue for complete happiness without a future re- corapence: and asserted, that a short happiness is as good as an eternal one.

Page 343. CHAPTER YH.

A state of future rev/ards necessarily connotes future punishments. The belief of the former without the latter might be of pernicious consequence. The an- tient philosophers and legislators were sensible of the importance and necessity of the doctrine of future punishments. Yet they generally rejected and dis- carded them as vain and superstitious teri'ors. The maxim universally held by the philosophers, that the gods are never angiy, and can do no hurt, consi- dered. Page sqa.

CHAPTER Vni.

The generality of the people, especially in the politer nations of Greece and Rome, had fallen in a great measure from the belief of a future stat.e before the

CONTENTS. ^^•

time of our Saviour's appearing. This is particularly shewn concerning the Greeks, by the testimonies of Socrates and Polybius. The same thing appears with regard to the Romans. Future punishments were disregarded and ridi- culed even among the vulgar, who iti this fell from the religion of their ances- tors. The- resurrection of the body rejected by the philosophers of Greece and Rome. Page 381.

CHAPTER IX.

Our Lord Jesus Christ bi'ought life and immortality into the most clear and open light by the Gospel. He both gave the fullest assurance of that everlasting hap- piness which is prepared for good men in a future state, and made the most in- viting discoveries of the nature and greatness of that happiness. The Gospel also contains express declarations concerning the punishment which shall be inflicted upon the wicked in a future state. The necessity and importance of this part of the Gospel Revelation shewn. The Conclusion, with some general reflections upon the whole. Page 399.

THE

ADVANTAGE AND NECESSITY

OF THE

CHRISTIAN REVELATION,

STATE OF RELIGION

LS THE

A3>rTIEXT HEATHEJSr WORLDs

PART II.

RELATING TO A RULE OP MORAL DUTY.

CHAPTER I.

Man appears from the frame of his nature to be a moraHtgent, ahd designed i& be governed by a law. Accordingly, God hath given him a law to be th6' rule of his duty. The scheme of those who pretend that this law is naturally and necessarily known to all men without instruction, contrary to feet and experience. Yet there are several ways by which men come to a knowledge of this law, and of the duty required of them; viz. by a moral sense implanted in the human heart; by a principle of reason judging from the natures and relations of things; by education, and human instruction: besides all which^ God hath made discoveries of his will eonceming our duty, in a way of extraor-' dinary Divine Revelation.

Having considered the state of the antient HeatheiS Nations, with respect to the knowledge and worship of the one true God, and shewn the need they stood in of an ex- traordinary Divine Revelation, to recover them from that^ amazing ignorance of God, and that idolatry and polythe- iism, into which they were fallen; I now proceed to the iiexi Vol., II, "A .

2 Man is a Moral Agent. Part IL

thing I proposed, which was to consider the state of the antient Heathen world with regard to a rule of moral duty. That it is of great importance to mankind to have clear directions given them concerning moral duty in its just extent, and to have it enforced upon them by a sufficient authority, and by proper arguments and motives, is evident to a considering mind. And many have been of opinion, that this is so manifest and obvious to natural reason, that there is no need of Divine Revelation, either to teach men their duty, or to enforce upon them moral obligations. This seems to have a plausible appearance, if we consider the matter abstractly, and in a way of speculation. But the surest way of judging of it is from fact and experience: for if it appears that in fact the most knowing and civilized nations in the heathen world, and the wisest and ablest men among them, have laboured under great uncertainties, and even fallen into dangerous errors with regard to several important branches of moral duty; and that they have also been greatly deficient in the proposing such motives, as might be most proper and efficacious for enforcing the practice of it; this affordeth a strong presumption of the weakness of human reason in this respect, when left merely to itself in the present state of mankind: and that an express Revelation from God, both for instructing us in moral duty in its just extent, and enforcing it upon us by the most powerful motives, would be of the greatest advantage to mankind.

. To prepare our way for a due consideration of this sub- ject, it will be proper, in the first place, to offer some gene» ral observations concerning man as a moral agent, and concerning the several ways by which he may be supposed to come to the knowledge of his duty.

That man is a moral agent, the proper subject of mora! government, is as evident as that he is a reasonable crea- ture, or that he is capable of virtue and vice, praise and

Chap. !• God hath given a Law to Mankind^ &c. s

blame. And whatever some persons may dispute in a way of speculation, moral or free agency, though it may be dif- ficult to settle the precise metaphysical notion of it, or to answer all the objections which subtil and sceptical men may form against it, is what all men are intimately con- scious of. The self-approving and self-condemning reflec- tions of a man's own mind plainly shew it to be so. God hath not only given man a body, and animal powers and instincts, suited to the uses and enjoyments of the animal and sensitive life, but he hath made him capable of dis- cerning the moral differences of things, and hath given him a sense of good and evil, right and wrong, a self-determin- ing and a self-reflecting power, whereby he is capable of ch using and acting for himself, and of passing a judgment on his own actions. There are few, but have had experience of an inward self-approbation or disapprobation, arising from the workings of a conscious principle within, accord- ing as they have been sensible of their having performed their duty or the contrary. And God's having made them creatures of such a kind, i. e. reasonable and moral agents, capable of a sense of moral obligation, is a demonstrative proof, that he designed them to be governed in that way, in which it is fit for moral agents to be governed; i. e. by giv- ing them laws to be the rule of their duty. And if God hath given men laws, it must be his will that those laws should be obeyed; and as a wise and righteous moral Governor, he will deal with them agreeably to the laws which he hath given them, and will reward or punish them according to their obedience or disobedience to those laws.

But since no law is obligatory, except it be promulgated, and in some way published to those who are to be governed by it, we may reasonably conclude, that if God hath given a law to mankind, which they are obliged to obey, he hath not left them under an invincible ignorance of that law, but hath made such discoveries of it to them, that if it be not

4 The Knowledge of Moral Duty Part II,

their own fault, they may know what that duty is which God requireth of them, as far as it is necessary for them to do so.

Some have carried this so far as to assert, that all men have a natural knowledge of the whole of their duty by an intimate conscious perception, and an inward universal light, independent of all outward teaching. To this they Sipply the passage of Lucan,

« -^ nee vocibus ullis

Numen eget, dixitque semel nascentibus auctor Quicquid scire licet."

As if God dictated to all men from their very birth, the whole of what is necessary for them to know with regard to their duty, so that they stand not in need of any farther vocal or verbal instruction. This seems to have been Lord Herbert's scheme, and is that of Dr. Tindal, in his famous book, intituled, " Christianity as old as the Creation." Lord Polingbroke frequently expresses himself to the same pur* pose. He says, that " natural Revelation (as he calls it) produces a series of intuitive knowledge from the first principles to the last conclusions («)." Where he supposes, that both the first principles of the law of nature, and all the conclusions drawn from them, are intuitively and infal- libly known to every man. Accordingly he declares, that *' it is a perpetual standing Revelation always made, always inaking, to all the sons of Adam," and affirms, that " it is intelligible at all times and all places alike, and proportion- ed to the meanest understanding (^)." Or, as he elsewhere has it, " The tables of the natural law are so obvious to the gijght of all men, that no man who is able to read the plain-^

(a) Bolingbroke's Works, vol. IV. p. 276. edit. 4to. (6)Ibid. p. 93.94. 96,97,

Chap. I. communicated to Mankind in various Ways. 5

est characters can mistake them (c)." According to this scheme, there is not the least need of any extraordinary- external Revelation. And it would equally prove, that all the endeavours of philosophers, moralists, and legislators, to instruct mankind in matters of morality, were perfectly needless and superfluous. I have already offered some con- siderations to shew the absurdity of this scheme (d): and the following treatise will contain the fullest confutation of it; by which it will appear how prone mankind have always been to mistake the law of nature, in very important in- stances of moral duty. It is indeed so contrary to the expe- rience and observations of all ages, that one would be apt to wonder that any men of sense should insist upon it: and yet the same pretence is still repeated by the enemies of Revelation. And some others of a different character have expressed themselves very inaccurately and unwarily on this subject.

But though this pretence of the universal clearness of the law of nature to all mankind, independent of all farther in- struction, cannot be admitted, as being contrary to the most evident fact and experience, yet it must be acknowledged, that a great deal hath been done in the course and order of Divine Providence, to lead men into the knowledge of the duty required of thtm.

And 1. There is a moral sense implanted in the human mind, which, if duly cultivated and improved, might be of great use for leading men, in many instances, to the notion and practice of moral duty. I know this is a point that has been contested, and I shall not here enter into the debate. But it seems to me, that something of this kind, by what-

(c) Bolingbroke's Works, vol. V. p. 153.

(d) See the first volume of this Work, Preliminary Discourse,

6 The Knowledge of Moral Duty Part IL

soever name it is called, must be admitted. Whosoever carefully examines his own heart, will be apt to think that there are moral feelings, distinct from mere reasoning, which incline him to certain ways of acting; and that the mind of man is so constituted, as to have an inward sense of moral beauty or deformity in affections and actions, which, when the human nature is in its right state, carries him to delight and take a complacency in some actions as right and fit, beautiful and lovely, and to dislike and disap- prove the contrary. Some traces of this are to be found in the human mind, even limits most degenerate state, and which can scarce ever be utterly erased. As there are natu- ral instincts distinct from reason, which tend to the preserva- tion and convenience of the animal and vital frame, so there seem to be instincts of a moral kind, or propensions and in- clinations, which, when duly regulated and improved, are of considerable use for leading men to a proper course of action. Such are the social and kind affections, so natural to the human heart, that they have obtained the name of hu- manity, and which shew that men were born not merely for themselves, but were designed by the author of their beings for mutual assistance, and the offices of benevo- lence.

But then, for preventing mistakes in this matter, there are several things proper to be here observed. One is, that this moral sense is not of equal strength and force in all men. It is most conspicuous and eminent in some noble and •generpus minds, in which a kind of natural propensity to justice, benevolence, gratitude, &c. remarkably appears, and powerfully operates: and in others it is so weak, as scarce to be perceived, or is overpowered by vicious habits and corrupt affections and appetites. It must be acknowledged on the one hand, that the moral sense is capable of being improved and strengthened by reason and reflection: and that on the other hand, it may be greatly perverted and de-

Chap. I. communicated to Mankind in various Ways. 7

praved by vicioU55 customs, inordinate lusts, and selfish in- terests, by false judgments of things, and evil examples. And I think it cannot be denied, that it is so much weakened in the present state of the human nature, that it is no way fit to be alone a sufficient guide in morals, but standeth in great need of farther direction and assistance. Some have carried their notions of the extent and efficacy of this moral s^nse beyond what reason and experience will warrant. The ingenious and polite Earl of Shaftesbury, after having ob- served, that there is a natural beauty of actions as well as figures, adds, that " no sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them discerned as soon as felt) than straight an in- ward eye distinguishes, and sees the fair and shapely, the amiable and admirable, apart from the deformed, the foul, the odious, and despicable." This is elegantly expressed: but I should think, that any one who impartially considers human nature, as it appears in the generality of mankind, must own that the inward eye, the eye of the mind, is now very much vitiated and obscured, and that there are many things which hinder its just discernment. The experience of all ages shews, that men have been generally apt to mis- take idolatry and superstition, than which nothing in the opinion of this noble author can be more odious and des- picable, for the most amiable thing in the world, true reli- gion and piety. And even with respect to the duties men owe to one another, and the government of their own affec- tions and passions, how often have they been mistaken in their notions of the fair, the amiable, and admirable, apart from the foul and deformed, the odious and despicable? The custom of exposing weak and helpless children, which, one should think, is contrary to the most intimate feelings of humanity, obtained very generally among the most civilized nations; and yet they do not appear to have been sensible that in this they acted a wrong and inhuman part, but rather

8 The Knowledge of Moral Duty PArt it,

looked upon it to be a prudent and jusiifiable practice. The various tribes of American savages, whom some have re- commended as following the genuine dictates of nature, are so far from feeling any remorse for the most cruel instances of revenge on their enemies, or those who, they think, have injured them, that they rejoice and glory in them as the no- blest exploits, and both applaud themselves, and are ap- plauded by others, on the account of them. Many other instances of the like kind might be mentioned, some of which I shall have occasion to take notice of in the course of this work. It is not therefore a rule to be depended on, which some have laid down, that no man can violate the law of nature without condemning himself. The pleasure or remorse men feel in their reflections on their own actions, is far ^rom being a sure mark and criterion of the moral goodness or evil of an action in the present state of man- kind. It is true, that the mind is naturally carried to ap- prove what it takes to be right and fit, and praise-worthy, and to disapprove and condemn what it takes to be base and wrong; but then, in many instances, it stands in need of direction and instruction as to what is right and wrong. And when it is well informed, then it is that it is fitly qualified to approve and condemn in the proper place. It appears, therefore, that what is called the moral sense was not designed to be an adequate guide in morals; nor is it alone considered, and left merely to itself, fit to have the supreme direction as to the moral conduct. It never was in- tended to preclude the necessity of instruction, but to be an assistant to our reason, to incline the mind more readily to its duty, and produce a complacency in it; and to create a dislike and abhorrence of that which is evil and base, and to restrain us from committing it.

This leads me to observe,

2dly, That there is in man a principle of reason, which

Gil AP. I. communicated to Mankind 'in various Ways. %

is designed to preside over the propeasions and affections^ and to direct the moral temper and conduct. Man has an un- derstanding given him, by which he is capable of enquiring? into the natures and relations of things, and considering what those relations require. And whatsoever clearly appeareth from the very nature and relations of things to be fit and right for reasonable creatures to perform, we may justly conclude^ that it is the will of God who constituted that nature and those relations they should perform; and when once it is considered as the will of God, the supreme universal Lord and moral governor, then it is regarded not merelv as fit and reasonable in itself, but as a divine law, in the strictest and properest sense.

This way of discovering our duty by searching into the nature and relations of things, when rightly performed, is of great extent. It signifiies, that we must form just and worthy notions of God, and of his glorious attributes and perfections, and the relations between him and us: that w© must know ourselves, and the frame and constitution of our' own natures, as also the relations we stand in towards our' fellow-creatures: that we must carefully consider and com-- pare all these, and the fitnesses and obligations arising from- them; and thence collect our duty towards God, our neigh- bours, and ourselves. There are many who represent this not only as the surest way of coming to the right knowledge of the duty which God requireth of us, but as easy and ob-' vious to all mankind. Lord Bolingbroke frequently talks,- as if every man was able in this way to fonii a complete system of Religion and Morals for himself, without the least difficulty. He says, that " we more certainly know the will of God in this way, than we can know it in any otheri*^

VoL.IL B

10 The Knowledge of Moral Duty Part II.

and, " that it admits of no doubt (^)." And that, "by env- ploying our reason to collect the will of God from the fund of our nature physical and moral, and by contemplating fre- quently and seriously the laws that are plainly and necessa- rily deducible from them, we may acquire not only a parti- cular knowledge of those laws^ but a general, and in short an habitual knowledge of the manner in which God is pleased to exercise his supreme power in this system, beyond which we have no concern (/ )•" I readily own, that this searching into the relations and constitution of things, when carried on in a proper manner, may be of great use for coming at the knowledge of the law of nature, and for shewing, that the main principles of moral duty are founded in the nature of things, and are what right reason, duly exercised, will ap- prove, when fairly explained and set in a proper light. But cenainly this is not the ordinary way for the bulk of man- kind to come to the knowledge of their duty. There are few who have leisure or capacity, or inclination for profound enquiries into the natures and reasons of things, and for drawing proper conclusions from them concerning the will of God. That which the ingenious and noble author now now mentioned seems to lay the principal stress upon, viz* the employing our reason to collect the will of God from the fund of our nature physical and moral, is far from being so easy a task as he represents it. The knowledge of the hu- man constitution, taken in a physical and moral view, in- cludes a knovrledge of body and soul in man, of the dis- tinction between them, and the union, of both, from whence duties result relating to the welfare of the whole compound: it takes in the knowledge of our appetites and passions, our

(e) BoUngbrokc's Works, Vol. IV. p. 287. and Vol. V. p. 196. edit. 4to. (/) Ibid. Vol. V. p. 100. See also p. 154. 178. 196. 271.

Chap. I. communicated to Mankind in various Ways, ii

affections and instincts, and of our rational and moral powers, that by comparing all these, we • may know where- in consisteth the proper order and harmony of our natures, what are the just limits of our appetites and passions, how far they are to be gratified, and how far to be restrained. And can it be pretended, that every particular person, if left merely to himself, is able, without assistance or instruc* tion, to consider and compare all these, and to deduce from them a complete system of laws for his own conduct? The rule which a noted author has laid down as sufficient for the direction of mankind is this, that "they are so to regu- late their appetites, as will conduce to the exercise of their reason, the health of their bodies, and the pleasure of their senses, taken and considered together, since therein their happiness consists (^)." But if this be all the law that any man has to govern him in this matter, it is to be fear- ed, that the bias of his appetites and passions, and the plea« sures of his senses, would generally bring over his reason to judge in their own favour. Lord Bolingbroke, who, in the passage cited above, supposes that all men may easily collect the will of God from the fund of their own nature physical and moral, gives this account of the human system: that "man has two principles of determination, affections and passions excited by apparent good, and reason, which is a sluggard, and cannot be so excited. Reason must be willed into action: and as this can rarely happen, when the will is already determined by affections and passions; so when it does happen, a sort of composition generally hap- pens between the two principles: and if the affections and passions cannot govern absolutely, they obtain more indul- gence from reason than they deserve, or than she would shew if she were entirely free from their force (/^).^' And

^g") Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 14. (A) Bolingbroke*s Works, Vol. V. p. 150. See also ibid. p. 1 !&, \S7, 22r.

313 The Knowledge of Moral Duty Part II.

he expressly affirms, that " the appetites, passions, and im- jnediate objects of pleasure, will always be of greater force to determine us than reason (z)." This, indeed, is too uni- versally expressed. It is not true, that the appetites and passions, and immediate objects of pleasure, will always be of greater force to determine us than reason. Many instances there have been of excellent persons, in whom reason has been of greater prevalence to determine them, than the pas- sions or present sensual pleasure. But it cannot be denied, that, in the present state of mankind, the case is generally as his Lordship represents it: and that, as he elsewhere speaks, " amidst the contingencies that must arise from the constitution of every individual, the odds will be on the side of appetite (i^)." To set up every man therefore for his own legislator, as if he were fit to be left to form a system of law and duty for himself, without any farther instruc- tions, is a romantic scheme, and would tend to introduce a general confusion and licentiousness, to the subversion of all good order and morality. As to the duties we owe to God, it sufficiently appears, from what was observed in the former part of this work, how little mankind are qualified, if left to themselves without instruction, to form a right judgment con^- cerning them. And with respect to that part of our duty which relates to the government of our own appetites and pas- sions, it will be easily acknowledged, that the bulk of mankind are not fit to be left to indulge them, as far as they themselves think reasonable. If every man was to judge of his duty by what, in his opinion, tends most to his. own happiness in the circumstances he is in (which is the rule laid down by those who make the highest pretences to the Law and Religion

(0 Bolingbroke's Works, Vol. V. p. 267, 268, \k) Ibid. p. 479.

Chap. I. communicated to Mankind in various Ways, 13

of Nature (/) in opposition to Revelation) it would soon bring in a very loose morality: since there is nothing in which men are more apt to deceive themselves, and to form false judgments, than in what relates to their proper happiness. And even as to that part of morals which re- lates to our duty towards mankind, and which includes the exercise of justice, fidelity, benevolence, charity, and the various offices of the social life, though there seem to be strong traces of it in the human mind, and it is what right reason must approve as agreeable to the relations we bear to one another, yet I believe it will be granted, that it would not be very propfer to leave every man merely to himself, to fix the measures of just and unjust, of right and wrong, in his dealings and transactions with other men. He would be often apt to judge by false weights and measures,^ and would be in great danger of being led aside by his passions and selfish affections and interests, which, it is to be feared, would frequently bribe his reason to form wrong and partial judgments of things. No human government could be safe upon this plan, if every man were to be left absolutely to his own direction, without any other guide. All the laws enacted by states and commonwealths, and all books of morality, written by the wisest men in all ages, proceed upon this supposition, that men stand in need of instruction and assistance, in order to the right forming and regulating their moral con- duct.

Accordingly, I would observe,

3dly, That another way by which men come to the knowledge of moral duty, is by the instructions of others. This seems to be manifestly intended by the Author of

(/) Dr. Tindal, Morgan and ot^iers.

14 The knowledge of Moral Duty Part 11.

our beings. We come into the world in an infant state: we receive our first ideas of things, the first rudiments of knowledge, from our parents, and those about us: and the notions which are instilled into our minds in our early years, often make a deep and lasting impression, and have no small influence upon our after- conduct. It is therefore one of the principal duties of parents to endeavour to train up their children betimes to worthy sentiments. Thus we find that, in the Jewish law, it is the express command of God, frequently urged by the highest authority, that pa- rents should take great and assiduous care to instruct their children in the statutes and precepts which God had given them, and in the duties there required. It is mentioned to the praise of that excellent person Abraham, that he com- manded his children " and household after him to keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment (?»)." The wisest men in all ages have been sensible of the great ad- vantage of a good education (n), and that men are not to be left merely to follow the dictates of rude, undisciplined, and uninstructed nature. As to matter of fact, it can scarce be denied, that no small part of the notions men have of right and wrong, and of what is blameable and praise- worthy, comes by education and custom, by tradition and instruction. And the vulgar almost every where adopt that scheme of religion and morals, which prevails in their respective countries. That great statesman and moralist PufFendorf, who was remarkable for his knowledge of the law of nature and of mankind, ascribes " the facility which children and ignorant people have in determining between just and unjust, right and wrong, to the habitude which

(m) Gen. xviii. 19.

(tt) See the Preliminary Discourse, in the first volume of this Work, p. 10.

Chap. I. communicated to Mankind in various Ways, is

they have insensibly contracted from their cradles, or from the time they first began to make use of their reason; by observing the good approved, and the evil disapproved, the the one commended and the other punished: and that it is owing to the ordinary practice of the principal mgixims of natural law in the events of common life, that there are few people who have any doubt whether these things might not be otherwise (o)." And Mr. Barbeyrac, in his notes upon it, after having observed that " there is a manifest proportion between the maxims of natural law, and the dictates of right reason; so that it is perceived by the most simple people from the moment they are proposed to them, and that they attend and examine them;" adds, that "per- haps they could never have discovered them of themselves, and cannot always comprehend the reasons of them, or distinctly explain what they perceive concerning them; and that though no man who is arrived at the age of discretion can reasonably pretend to excuse himself as to this matter by invincible ignorance, yet it is nevertheless true, that education, instruction, and example, arc the ordinary canals by which these ideas enter into the minds of men: without this, the greater part of mankind would either almost en- tirely extinguish their natural light, or would never give the least attention to them. Experience shews this but too plainly. Many things there are among savage people, and even among the most civilized nations, sufficient to justify this melancholy and mortifying truth. From whence (saith he) it ought to be concluded, that every man should use his best endeavours to contribute, as far as is in his power, to instruct others in their duty, to establish, strengthen, and

(o) De Jur. Nat. et Gent. lib. ii. chap. 3. sect. 13.

1© The knowledge of Moral Duty Part II.

propagate so useful a knowledge (/»)." This is certainly one considerable instance in which the Author of our be- ings intended that men should be helpful to one another, in proportion to their abilities and opportunities. But it is, in a particular manner, incumbent upon parents, masters of families, legislators and magistrates, the ministers of reli- gion, and those who profess to instruct men in the science of morals. And such instructions properly given are, no doubt, of great advantage, and what we ought to be very thankful for. But it is manifest from experience, that mere- ly human instruction cannot be absolutely depended upon: and that men have been often led into wrong notions of morality, in very important instances, by those who ought to have instructed them better.

I would therefore observe farther, that besides the se- veral ways which have been mentioned, whereby men come to the knowledge of moral duty, there is great need of a Divine Revelation, in order to the setting their duty before them in its just extent, and enforcing it upon them by the highest authority. It cannot reasonably be denied, that God can, if he thinks fit, make discoveries of his will to mankind, in a way of extraordinary Revelation (^); and it is manifest, that if he should please to do so, such a Di- vine Revelation, confirmed by sufficient evidence, and prescribing in his name the particulars of our duty in plain and express precepts, would be of great use, and would come with much greater weight and force, than merely human laws, or the reasonings of philosophers and mo-

(/? ) See Barbeyrac's Puffendorf, torn. I. p. 217. not. 7. edit. Amst.

(y) See concerning this in the Preliminary Discourse prefixed to the former volume, p. 20, et seq.

Chap, h communicated to Mankind ifi various Ways, if

ralists: and this method also hath God taken in his deaU ings with mankind; which is a convincing proof of his goodness, and the care he hath exercised towards them, in order to the leading men to the right knowledge and prac^ tice of their duty.

VaL. II.

1 8 The principal Heads of Moral Law made known Part II.

CHAPTER II.

The principal heads of moral duty were made known to mankind from the be^ ginning, and continued to be known and acknowledged in the patriarchal ages, "When men fell from the right knowledge of God, they fell also in important instances from the right knowledgt- of moral duty. The law given to the peo- ple of Israel was designed toins-tiucl and direct them in morals, as well as ia the knowledge and worship ot the one true God. A great deal was done ia the methods of Divine Providence, to preserve the sense and knowledge oC morals among the heathen nations; but they did not make aright use of the helps afforded them.

IT has been shewn, in the former part of this work, that as the first man was formed in an adult state, and placed in a world ready prepared, and amply provided for his re- ception and entertainment, so there is great reason to think, that God communicated to him the knowledge of religion, in its main fundamental articles, especially relating to the existence and perfections of the Deity, and the crea- tion of the world, that he might be in an immediate capa- city of serving his Maker, and answering the great end of his being. And one of the first and most natural enquiries, when he was made acquainted with the existence of a God of infinite perfections, his Creator and Sovereign Lord, must have been what God would have him to do, and what was the duty required of him, in order to secure the Divine Favour and Approbation. For it cannot rea- sonably be supposed, that he was left absolutely to himself, and to his own will, to act as he thought fit, without any higher direction or law to govern him. He could have no human instructor to teach, or to advise him: he had no pa- rents or progenitors, whose knowledge and experience might have been of use to him; and as he had no expe- perience of his own, it is not probable that, in his circum-

Chap. II. to Jjian in the Beginning by Diving Revelation. 19

stances, he was left to frame a rule of duty for himself, and to find out the will of God by profound disquisitions into the nature and relations, of things. We may therefore justly suppose, that a wise and good God, who designed him to be governed by a law, gave him a law by which he should be governed, and communicated his will to him in relation to the duty required of him. And that this wa» actually the case in fact, may be concluded from the short account given us by Moses of the primaeval state of man. From that account it appears, that man was not left at hi» first formation merely to acquire ideas in the ordinary way, which would have been too tedious and slow as he was circumstanced, but was at once furnished with the knowledge that was then necessary for him. He was imme- diately endued with the gift of language, which necessarily supposes that he was furnished with a stock of ideas; a specimen of which he gave in giving names to the inferior animals, which were brought before him for that purpose. The same gift of lianguage was imparted to the consort provided for him; and they both were admitted in several instances to a near intercourse with their Maker, and were immediately favoured with notions of several things which it concerned them to know. It pleased God to acquaint ihem with the dominion he had invested them with over the several creatures in this lovver world: they had a di- vine allowance and directions as to the food it was proper for them to eat: they were instructed that they were to be the parents of a numerous offspring, and that they were to replenish the earth. The institution and law of marriage, which was given them, shews that they were made ac- quainted with the duties of the conjugal relation; with which are nearly connected the duties required of them as parents towards the children which should proceed from them, and the duties which their children should render to them, and to one another. As God gave them the law of

$0 The principal Heads of Moral Law made known Part II.

the Sabbath, we may well conclude that he directed them as to the proper way of sanctifying it by worshipping him the great Creator and Lord of the universe, and cele- brating his glory as shining forth in the creation of the world, of which the Sabbath was designed to keep up a religious remembrance. The precept and injunction which was laid upon them not to eat the forbidden fruit, compre- hended a considerable part of the moral law under it. It was designed to instruct them that they were not the abso- lute Lords of this lower world, but were under the do- minion of an higher Lord, to whom they owed the most entire subjection, and unreserved obedience, in an implicit resignation to his supreme wisdom and goodness: that they were bound to exercise a government over their appetites ?ind inclinations, and not to place their highest happiness in the gratification of them^ and that they were not only to govern their bodily appetites, but to guard against an in- ordinate ambition, and to restrain their desires of know- ledge within just bounds, without prying with an unwar- rantable curiosity into things which God thought fit to con- ceal from them. Upon the whole, we may justly conclude, that the first parents of the human race had the knowledge of God, and of the main articles of their duty divinely com- fnunicated to them, as far as was proper, and suited to the state and circumstances they were in (r).

(r) Puffendorf, who must be acknowledged to be a very able judge in what relates to the law of nature, declares, in a passage J cited before, that *'itis very probable, that God taus^ht the first men the chief heads of natural law, which were afterwards preserved and spread among their descendants by means of education and custom." He adds, that this does not hinder, but that the knowledge of them maybe called natural, inasmuch as the truth and certainty of them may be discovered in a way of reasoning,

Grotius

Chap. II. to Man in the Beginning by Divine Revelation, 21

After the fall and disobedience of our first parents, new duties arose suited to the alteration of their circumstances. They were now to regard God as their offended Sovereign and Lord: discoveries were made to them both of his jus- tice and righteous displeasure against sin, and of his placa- bleness towai'ds penitent sinners, and his pardoning mercy; without an assurance of which they might have sunk under those desponding fears which a consciousness of their guilt was apt to inspire. Repentance towards God, a submission to his justice in the punishment inflicted upon them for their disobedience, hope in his mercy, and a reliance on the promise he was graciously pleased to make to them, a fear of offending him for the future, and* a desire of approving themselves to him by a new and dutiful obedience; these were dispositions which it was the will of God they should exercise. And as they stood in great need of a divine direc- tion in those circumstances, it is reasonable to think that he signified his will to them in relation to their future con- duct, and the religion required of fallen creatures. The history which Moses has given of the antediluvian world is very short: but in the account given of Cain and Abel it is plainly intimated, that there was in those early ages an intercourse between God and man, that he did not leave them without discoveries of his will, that a law had been given them with relation to the external worship of God, and particularly concerning the offering of sacrifice. Accordingly they both observed it as an act of religion; but Abel, who was a better man, with a more pious disposi- tion than Cain. He is said, by the sacred writer to the He-

Grotius also gives it as his opinion, that the law was oriq^inally promulgated to Adam, the father of mankind, and througl. Jiim to the human race; and again to Noah, the second father of man- kind, and by him transmitted to his descendants.

22 The Principal Heads of Moral Law made known Part H.

brews, to have oflfered sacrifice by faith, which seems plainly to refer to a divine institution and appointment; and that he well knew it was a rite which God required, and would accept. And its having spread so universally, among all nations from the most nntient times, can scarce be accounted for but by supposing it to have been a part of Religion transmitted from the first ages to the whole race of mankind {s). What was said to Cain, and the curse inflicted upon him, supposed a divine law obliging to mu- tual love and benevolence, and of which the violence com- mitted on his brother was a manifest breach. There were in the old world preachers of righteousness, who, we have reason to think, declared the will and law of God to men, and urged it upon them in his name, and by his authority. So Noah is called, 2 Pet. ii. 5. and such was that excel- lent person Enoch, and probably several others. To which it may be added, that if God had not made express dis- coveries of his will to men, and given them laws bound upon them by his own Divine Authority, their guilt would not have been so highly aggravated as to draw down upon them so dreadful a ruin and condemnation. But they sin- ned presumptuously, and with a high hand: they allowed themselves in an unrestrained indulgence of their lusts and appetites, and committed all sorts of violence, rapine, and wickedness, in the most manifest opposition to the divine law. They seem to have fallen into an atheistical neglect and contempt of all religion; and therefore are justly called

(s) The reader may compare what is here said with the first chapter of the former volume, in which several of the things Jiere mentioned are more fully insisted upon; but it was necessary to take some notice of them in this place, to show that God from the beginning made discoveries of his will to men concerning their duty.

Chap. II. to man in the Beginning by Divine Revelation. 2a

" the world of the ungodly," 2 Pet. ii. 5. And the pro- phecy of Enoch, mentioned by St. Jude, seems particularly to charge them with the most audacious profaneness, and open contempt of Religion, both in their words and actions, for which the divine judgments were denounced against them.

Noah, with his family, who survived that destruction, was no doubt well acquainted with those divine laws, for the transgression of which the sinners of the old world were so severely punishedj and a man of his excellent character, we may be sure, took care to transmit them to his children and descendants: and the awful proofs of the divine justice and displeasure against the wicked and disobedient, tended to give the instructions and admoni- tions delivered to them by this preacher of righteousness a peculiar force. It appears from the brief hints given by Moses, that God made renewed discoveries of his will after the flood to this second father of mankind, and gave laws and injunctions which were designed to be obligatory on the whole human race. The tradition of the Jews relating to the precepts delivered to the sons of Noah is well known. And though we have not sufficient proof, that they were precisely in number or order what they pretend, yet that the substance of those precepts was then given and promulgated to mankind by Divine Authority, there is good reason to believe. And consider- ing the narrowness of the Jewish notions, their strong prejudices against the Gentiles, and the contempt they had for them, this tradition of theirs deserves a particular regard. For it shews, that it was an antient tradition among them, derived from their ancestors, that God was the God not of the Jews only but also of the Gentilesif that he had not entirely cast the Gentiles off from the be- ginning, without making discoveries of his will to them concerning religion, and tbeir moral duty: but had given

24 A great deal was done for the Heathen Nations Part II«

them laws, upon the observance of which they were in a state of favour and acceptance with God (^). The moral laws which were afterwards published to the people of Israel, a summary of which is contained in the ten com- mandments, were in substance known before in the patriarch- al times. And these divine injunctions, which were regarded as having been given by God to men, and enforced by a Divine Authority, may justly be supposed to be referred to in that remarkable passage. Gen. xviii. 19. where God saith concerning Abraham^ " I know him, that he will com- mand his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord to do justice and judgment." And no doubt that great patriarch did what God knew and declared he would do: and from him proceeded many and great nations. If we examine the antient book of Job, who descended from Abraham, and lived before the promulga- tion of the Mosaic law, we shall find that there is scarce any one of the moral precepts, which were afterwards pub- lished to the people of Israel, but what may be traced in

(^) In the Talmudical books mention is made of " the pious among the nations of the world," and a portion is assigned to them, as well to as the Israelites, in the world to come. Agree- ably to this determination, Maimonides positively asserts, that the pious among the Gentiles have a portion in the world to come, De Poenit. cap. 3. i e.; as it is there explained, those that observed the precepts given to the sons of Noah; by whom they understood all mankind. See also Geniar. Babylon, ad titul. Aboda Zara, cap. i. Menasseh Ben Israel de Resur. Mort. lib. ii. cap. 8 et 9. These, with other testimonies, are cited by Sel- den de Jure Nat. et Gent. lib. vii. cap. 10. p. 877. Edit. Lips* The passage there quoted by him from the Gemara Babylonica ad titul. Aboda Zara, is remarkable; which he translates thus, *1 etiam Paganum, qui diligenter legem observaverit, voluti Pontificem Maximum habendum:" i. e. as Mr. Selden explains it, " inter primaries Ebraeorum, quantum ad prsenaium attinet? ceusendum."

Chap. 11. to lead them to the knowledge of Moral Duty, 25

the discourses of that excellent man and his friends, and which are there represented as having been derived by tradition from the most antient times (w).

After the deluge, it is probable that the heads and lead- ers of the dispersion, carried with them some of the main principles, both of religion and law, into the several places where they respectively settled: from whoih they were transmitted to their descendants. For in those early ages, as Plato observes in the beginning of his third book of laws, the people were wont to follow the laws and customs of their parents and ancestors, and of the most antient men among them. It strengthens this, when it is considered, that the most important moral maxims were delivered in the earliest times, not in a way of reasoning, as they were afterwards by the moralists in the ages of learning and phi- losophy, but in a way of ' authority, as principles derived from the antients, and which were regarded as of a divine

(u) Grotius mentions some institutions and customs common to all men, and which cannot be so properly ascribed to an in- stinct of nature, or the evident conclusions of reason, as to a perpe- tual and almost uninterrupted tradition from the first ages, such as the slaying and otfering up of sacrifices, the pudor circa res vene- reas, the solemnities of marriage, the abhhorrence of inces uous copulations. De Verit. Rclig. Christ, lib. i. sect. 7. See also De Jur. Bel. et Pac. lib. ii. cap. 5. sect. 13. And Mr. Le Cierc, though fond of the hypothesis, that many of the Mosaic rites were instituted in imitation of those of the Egyptians, yet, speak- ing of the offering of the first-fruits to God, which was in use both among the Egyptians and Hebrews, says, that it was not derived from the one of these nations to the oiher, but came to both from the earliest ages, and probably was originally of di- vine appointment. And he adds, that perhaps from the «anie source many other usages among both those people were deri- ved. See Cleric. Commentar. in Pentat. in his notes on Levit. xxiii. 10.

Vol. ii. D

26 A g-r eat deal was done for the Heathen Nations Part IL

original. It was a notion which generally obtained among the Heathens, that the original law was from God, and that it derived its obliging force from a Divine Authority. The learned Selden has collected many testimonies to this purpose from poets, philosophers, and other celebrated Pagan writers (^). It is probable that this notion was owing not only to the belief which obtained among them of a divine superintending providence, but to the traditionary accounts they had of God's having given laws to the first men in the most antient times. And so strongly was a sense of this impressed upon the minds of the people, that it belong- ed to the Divinity to give laws to mankind, that the most antient legislators, in order to give their laws a proper weight and authority, found it necessary to persuade them that these laws were not merely of their own contriving, but were what they had received from the gods. And it is probable, that they took some of the chief heads of moral law, which had been handed down by antient tradition, into the laws of their respective states and civil communities, especially as far as they tended to the preservation of the public order and good of the society. It was in the eastern countries, where men first settled after the flood, that civil polities were first formed: there they were near the foun- tain-head of antient tradition, and there the greatest remains of it were preserved (z/). And from thence the legislators

. {x) De Jure Nat. et Gent. lib. i. cap. 8. p. 94. et scq. edit. Lips.

(y) " The eastern sages were famous for their excellent mo- ral maxims, derived by tradition from the most antient times. This is observable concerning the antient wise men among the Persians, Babylonians, Bactrians, Indians, Egyptians. That cele- brated Chinese philosopher and moralist Confucius, did not pre- tend himself to be the author of the moral precepts he delivered, but to have derived ihem from wise men of much greater an»

Chap. II. to lead them to the Knowledge of Moral Duty, 27

in Grttece and Italy, and the western parts, principally de- rived their laws.

It appears from the account which hath been given, that a great deal had been done, in the course of the Divine Providence, for leading men into the knowledge of their duty. God had given laws to mankind from the beginning, and made express discoveries of his will to the first pa- rents and ancestors of the human race, concerning the prin- cipal points of duty required of them. They were bound by his authority, and by all manner of obligations, to transmit the knowledge of them to their descendants. And this was the more easily done, as they were agreeable to the best moral sentiments of the human heart, and to the dictates of reason, which, if duly exercised, might see them to be con- formable to the nature and relations of things. To which it may be added, that the^good tendency of them was confirm- ed by observation and experience. And accordingly, the bulk of mankind, in all ages and nations, have still retained such notions of good and evil, as have laid a foundation for the approbation and disapprobation of their own minds and consciences. Taking all these things together, the laws and precepts originally given by Divine Revelation, the remains of which continued long among the Gentiles, the moral sense of things implanted in the human heart, and the dic-

tiquity: particularly from Pung, who lived near a thousand years before him, and who also professed to follow the doctrine of the anlients; and especially from Tao and Xun, two eminent Chinese legislators, who, according to the Chinese chronology, lived above 1500 years before Confucius. Or, if we should sup- pose their chronology not to be exact, yet still it would follow, that the knowledge of morals was derived from the earjiest ages, when philosophy and sciences had made but small progress." See Navarette's Hist, of China, p. 123. and Scientia Sinensis Latine exposita, p. 120. .

29 Idolatry had a bad Effect in corrupting Part II.

tates of natural reason and conscience, which were never utterly extinguished in the Pagan world, together with the prescriptions of the civil laws, which in many instances ex- hibited good directions for regulating the conduct; I say, taking all these things together, it must be acknowledged, that the Pagans were not left destitute of suitable helps, which, if duly improved, might have been of great use for leading, them to the right knowledge and practice of moral duty (z). And undoubtedly there were eminent

(z) St. Paul represents the Gentiles as having the " work of the law written in their hearts." The expression is evidently me- taphorical, and not to be pushed too far. It is not designed to signify, as some have understood it, that all mankind have the whole law of God, comprehending every part of moral duty, written in plain characters upon their hearts: for this would prove that all men have naturally a clear knowledge of the whole of their duty without instruction: which is contrary to the most evident fact and experience, and to what the apostle elsewhere observes concerning the Gentiles. But though this could not be his meaning in this manner of expression, yet it certainly signi- fies, that the Gentiles, who had not the written law in their hands, were not left entirely destitute of a law. And when in any instances, they did some of the things contained in the law (for they were far from doing all things therein contained, as the apostle proves) they shewed that in those instances they had the work of the law written in their hearts; i. e. that they had an inward sense of the Divine Law in some of its important branches, so as to lay a foundation for the self-approving or self- condemning reflections of their own minds, and for their being judged by God on the account of them. This is evidently the apos- tle's intention in this passage. And it must be acknowledged, that there were scarce any of the Heathens, even in times of their greatest degeneracy, but had in some respects the work of the law written in their hearts, i. e. some inward sense of right and wrong, of good and evil; to which their consciences bore wit- ness: though undoubtedly this sense of moral duty was in some

Chap. II. their moral Notions and Practices. 29

examples among them of generosity, patience, fortitude, equanimity, a love of justice, benevolence, gratitude, and other virtues. In Greece and Rome, in their best times, there seem to have been some hereditary notions, derived from their ancestors, and cherished and confirmed by edu- cation and custom, of what is virtuous, honourable, and praiseworthy, and the contrary; which had a great effect upon their conduct. But, after all, it cannot be denied, thaf the notions of morality among them and the other Pagans, were in many respects greatly defective, and depraved with corrupt mixtures.

As they fell from the right knowledge of the one true God, which, as a learned author (a), who is a warm advo- cate for the Morality of the Pagans, observes, is " the great foundation of morality," they fell also from a just know- ledge of moral duty iTh very important instances. Idolatry not only introduced a great corruption into the worship of God, and all that part of duty which immediately relateth to the Supreme Beifig, but also into their moral conduct in other respects. Especially, when the worship of hero deities

of them far clearer and of greater extent than in others, and in all of them vastly short of what weenjoy, who have the benefit of the Christian Revelation. The apostle, speaking of the Gen- tiles at the time of the publication of the Gospel, represents them as amazingly corrupted, even in their moral notions of things. He gives it as their general character, that they " had their understandings darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that was in them, because of the blindness of their hearts." And then he goes on to shew the happy change that was wrought in those of them who were "taught the truth as it is in Jesus.'V Eph. iv. 17, 18, 19,20, 21, kc.

(a) Sykes's Connect, and Principles of Natural and Revealeel Religion, p. 364.

50 The Law given to the People of Israel of use Part IL

became general, many of whom gave examples of vicious conduct, the worship of such gods naturally tended to cor- rupt their moral notions and sentiments, and to make them very loose and dissolute in their practice: to which may be added bad and immoral customs, owing to various causes. And in many places their civil laws, though they were of use to their morals in several instances, yet led them astray in others. And even their wise men and philosophers fre- quently advanced notions inconsistent with the truth and purity of morals, of which full proof will b^ given in the ensuing part of this treatise.

When idolatry and polytheism began to spread generally among the nations, it pleased God to select a peculiar peo- ple, among whom a polity was erected of an extraordinary kind; the fundamental principle of which was the knowledge and worship of the one true God, and him only, in opposi- tion to all idolatry. He also gave them a code of holy and excellent laws, containing the main articles of the duty which God requires of men, in plain and express precepts. The moral laws obligatory on all mankind were summarily comprehended in the Ten Commandments, which were promulgated by God himself with a most amazing solemnity at mount Sinai, and written in the two tables of stone, to be a standing law to that people. They were not left to them- selves, to work out a system of moral duty merely by their own reason. Even such things as seemed most plain to the common sense of mankind, as the precepts prescribing the honouring our parents, and forbidding to kill, steal, and commit adultery, were bound upon them by express laws from God himself, and enforced by his own Divine Autho- rity. And he commanded them to be very assiduous and diligent in teaching those laws to their children, and in- structing them in the particulars of the duty which God

Chap. II. to preserve the Knowledge of Moral Duty, 31

required of them (b). And it is very probable, that the fame of their laws, and the glorious proofs of a Divine Autho- rity bywhich they were enforced, was spread abroad among the nations. This seems to be plainly signified in what Mo- ses declares to the people of Israel, when speaking of the statutes and judgments which the Lord commanded them, he saith, " Know therefore, and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding, in the sight of the nations, which shall hear all these statutes, and sa\ , Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people." He adds, "And what nation is there so great that hath statutes and judg- ments so righteous as all this law which I set before you this day (c)?" It may reasonably be supposed that as the reputation of Moses as a lawgiver was very high among the nations, his la^ s might, in several instances, serve as a pattern to other lawgivers, who might borrow some of the Mosaic precepts and institutions. Artapanus, as cited by Eusebius, probably speaks the sentiments of many other Heathens, when he so highly extols the wisdom of Moses and his laws, and saith, that he delivered many things very useful to mankind, and that from him the Egyptians them- selves borrowed tnany institutions (<af). This might be true in several instances, though he is mistaken in those he par- ticularly mentions. Many learned men have observed a great affinity between some of the laws enacted in Athens and other states, and those of Moses, who published his laws before the most antient legislators that we know of published theirs. And there is good reason to believe, that the Mosaic laws were the first laws that were ever commit- ted to writing.

(6) Deut. vi. 6, 7.

(c) Ibid. iv. 6, 7, 8.

(d) Euseb. Prsep. Evangel, lib. ix. cap. 27. p. 1.

is The Law given to the People of Israel, Sic. Part IL

But though it is probable the laws given by Moses, in the name of God himself, were of advantage, in many in- stances, to preserve the sense and knowledge of moral duty among the nations, yet as those laws were in a special man- ner delivered to one particular nation, who were for wise ends kept separate by some peculiar usages from other peo- ple, they were not so well fitted for universal use. It pleased God, therefore, at the time which seemed most fit to his infinite wisdom, in compassion to the wretched state of mankind, after having exercised long patience and forbear- ance towards them, to make a new Revelation of his Will, which was commanded to be published to all nations, in which their duty is set before them in its just extent, en- forced by God's own express authority, and by such argu- ments and motives, as are most proper to work upon the mind. This Revelation and system of Divine Laws is brought us by the most illustrious messenger that could be sent for that purpose, the Son of God in human flesh. His Divine Mission was confirmed by the most convincing attestations; and he hath also exemplified to us the Divine Law in all its purity and excellency, in his own Sacred Life and Practice, and hath provided the most gracious assist- ances to help our infirmities, that we may be the better en- abled to perform the duties required of us. And what great need the world stood in of such a Revelation, and conse- quently how thankful we should be for so great a blessing, is what I now proceed distinctly to shew. .

S3

CHAPTER Hi.

A particular enquiry into the state of morality in the Heathen -world. A ooHi- plete rule of morals, taken ia its just extent, comprehends the duties relating to God, our neighbours, and ourselves. If the Heathens had Such a rale among them, it would appear either in the precepts of their religion, or in the pre- scriptions of their civil laws, or customs which have the force of laws, or in the doctrines and instructions of their philosophers and moralists. It is projiosed distinctly to consider each of these. As to what passed among them for reli- gion, morality did not properly make any part of it, nor was it the office of their priests to teach men virtue. As to the civil laws and constitutions, supposing them to have been never so proper for civil government, they were not fitted to he an adequant rule of morals. The best of them were, in several respects, greatly defective. Various instances produced of civil laws, and of customs •which had the force of laws, among the most civilized nations, especially among the antient Egyptians and Greeks, which were contrary to the rules of morality."

jyiORAL duty, taken in its just extent, is usually and justly divided into three main branches. The first relates ta the duties of piety we more immediately owe to Gody •which includes the rendering him that religious worship and adoration, that love and reverence, that trust and affi- ance, that unreserved submission, resignation, and obe- dience, which is due to him from his reasonable creatures. The second relates to the duties we owe to our neighbours^ or to mankind, which takes in all that is comprehended in the exercise of justice, charity, mercy, benevolence, fidelity toward our fellow-creatures, and all the various offices and virtues of the social life* The third relates more immtdi- ately to ourselves, and includes all the duties of self-go- vernment, the keeping our appetites and passions under proper regulations, and maintaining a purity of body and soul, and whatsoever tends to the right ordering of our own temper, and to the attaining the true rectitude and perfec= tion of our nature. That cannot be said to be an adequant Voh. IL E *

34 An Enquiry mto the State of Morality Part IL

rule of moral duty, which does not extend to all these, with sufficient authority, clearness, and certainty. By this let us examine the state of morality in the Heathen world: and, upon an impartial enquiry, we shall find, that though that part of moral law, which relates to civil dutj^ and social vir- tue, was for the most part preserved, as far as was neces- sary to the peace and order of society; yet as to the other branches of duty, that which relates to the duties we more immediately owe to God, and that which relates to self-go- vernment and purity, it was through the corruption of man- kind greatly perverted and depraved. If the Heathens had among them a complete and settled rule of moral duty in its just ifXtent, it must be found either in the precepts of their religion, and instructions of its ministers, or in the prescriptions of the civil laws and the institutions of the magistrates, or in customs that had the force of laws, or lastly, in the doctrines and maxims of their philosophers ana moralists.

' There needs not much be said as to the first of these. Religion, when it is of the right kind, and considered in its most comprehensive notion, takes in the whole of moral duty, as necessarily belonging to it, and both prescribes it in its just extent, and enforces it by the highest authority, that of God himself, and by the most important motives. But in this the Heathen religion was very defective. There were indeed some general principles of religion, which were in some measure preserved among the Pagan nations, and neVer were entirely extinguished, relating to the exist- ence and attributes of the Deity, and to a Providence ex- ercising an inspection over human actions and affairs, and rewarding the virtuous and punishing the wicked. The no- tions of these things, though attended with much obscurity, and perverted and debased with many corrupt mixtures, yet had a good effect in lajing restraints upon vice and wickedness, and encouraging virtue, and keeping up the face

Chap. III. in the Heathen World, 35

of order among the people; and were actually made use of by the wisest and ablest legislators for that purpose. But what passed for religion among the Pagans and was esta- blished by their laws, and administered by their priests, neither taught any scheme of doctrines necessary to be be- lieved, nor held forth a code of laws or rule of moral duty for regulating and directing the practice. It consisted pro- perly in the public rites and ceremonies to be observed in the worship of their deities. " The priests (as Mr. Locke observes) made itnottheirijusiness toteach men virtue (e)." Their office was, according to the account Varro gives of it, to instruct men what gods they were to worship, what sa- crifices they were to offer to their several deities, and to direct them in what manner they were to observe the ap- pointed rites. It is true, that Cicero, in his Oratio prodomo sua ad Pontifices, represents them as having a general in- spectio!? over the manners of the citizens: but this they did not properly as priests of religion, but as ministers of the state. For in the Roman government, the same persons acted in both capacities, and the priesthood was so mo- delled as to answer the civil and political views of the com- monwealth. It is a just observation of the Baron Puffendorf, that " what the Romans called Religion was chiefly insti-

(e) To the same purpose Lactantius observes, that those who taught the worship of the gods, gave no directions as to what related to the regulation of men's manners, and to the conduct of life. " Nihil ibi disseritur, quod proficiat ad mores excolendos, vitamque formandam." And that among the Pagans, philosophy [or the doctrine of morals] and the religion of the gods, were entirely distinct, and separated from one another. " Philosophia et religio deorum disjuncta sunt, longeque discr^ta." Divin. In- stit. lib. iv. cap. 3. See also Augustin. de Civit. Dei, lib. ii. cap. 4. 6.et7.

36 Morality made no proper part Part II.

tuted for the benefit of the state, that they might be the betttr able to rule the minds of the people, according to the conveniencies and exigencies of the public." He adds, that ♦'there were no certain heads or articles of religion among the Romans, whence the people might be instructed concern- ing the Being and Will of God, or how they ought to regu- late their practice and actions so as to please God (7^)." Those who were diligent in the observation of the sacred customary rites, and worshipped the gods according to the laws, were looked upon as having fulfided the duties of re- ligion. But no farther regard was had to their morals, than as the interest of the state was concerned. If at any time the public was exposed to great calamities, and it was thought necessary to appease the gods, and avert their displeasure, repentance and a reformation of manners was never pre- scribed by the priests, as one of the means appointed by religion for that purpose: but they had recourse on §uch oc- casions to some odd and trifling ceremonies; such as the dic- tator's striking a nail into a door, or something of the like' nature (^). So far was the Heathen religion, and the wor- ship of their deities, from giving men a right notion of xnorality, or engaging them to the practice of it, that in many instances the rites made use of in the worship of their gods were of an immoral nature, and instead of pro- moting the practice of virtue, had a tendency to encou- rage vice and licentiousness. This sufficiently appears from the instances produced in the former volume, chap. vii. To the instances there mentioned, I nqw add, what a very

(/) Puffendorf *s Introduct. to the Hist, of Europe, chap. 1. sect. 10.

{g) Hume*s Nat. History of Religion, p. 105. Div. Legation of Moses, vol. I. p. 97. edit. 4th.

Chap. III. of the Heathen Religion. 3f

learned writer has observed, that Aristotle, in his Politics, " having blamed all lewd and obscene images and pictures, excepts those of the gods, which religion has sanctified (/i)."

It appears then, that if a complete rule of morals was to be found among the Pagans, we must not look for it in their religion, but either in the civil laws and constitu- tions, and customs which obtained the force of laws, or ia the doctrines and precepts of the philosophers and mora' lists.

Many have spoke with admiration of the civil laws and constitutions, which were in force among the Pagan na- tions, as if they were sufficient to direct and regulate their moral conduct. Some of the most eminent of the antient philosophers seem to resolve the whole duty of a good man into obedience to the laws of his country. Socrates de- fines the just tnan to be one that obeys the laws of the re- public, and that he becomes unjust by transgressing them (i). And Xenophon accordingly observes, that that philosopher was in all things for adhering closely and inviolably to tha laws, both publicly and privately, and exhorted all men t> do so (Ji). And many passages might be produced to shew, that both he and Plato, and the philosophers in general, urged it as the duty of the citizens to make the laws of their country the rule of their practice, both in religious and civil matters. Some modern authors have talked in ths same strain, and have laid the chief stress on human laws and government, as giving the best directions, and furnish- ing the most effectual means, for the securing and im- proving the moral state (/). It cannot be denied, that there

Qi) Hume's Nat. History of Religion, p. 1 54. (?) Xenoph. Memor. Socr. lib. iv. cap. 4. sect. 13. (Ar) Ibid. lib. i. sect. 1, 2, et seq.

(/) Lord Bolingbroke's Works, Vol. V. p. 480, 481. edit. 4to.

This*

38 Laws and Customs of the Heathens considered. Part II.

were many excellent laws and constitutions among the Heathen nations, and which were of grtat use in regulating iIe manners of men, and preserving good order in society: but it is no hard matter to prove, that the civil laws of any community are very imperfect measures of moral duty. A man may obey those laws, and yet be far from being fuly virtuous: he may not be obnoxious to the penalties of those laws, and yet be a vicious and bad man. Nor indeed is it the proper design of those laws to render men really and inwardly virtuous, but so to govern their outward be- haviour, as to maintain public order. The highest end they propose is the temporal welfare and prosperity of the state. The heart, the proper seat of virtue and vice, is not within the cognizance of civil laws and human governments. Nor can the sanctions of those laws, or any rewards and pu- nishments which the ablest human legislators can contrive, be ever applied to enforce the whole of moral duty. They cannot reach to the inward temper, or the secret affections aid dispositions of the soul, and intentions of the will, on vhich yet the morality of human actions, or their being good and evil in the sight of God, does principally depend. Seneca says very well, that " it is a narrow notion of inno- cence to measure a man's goodness only by the law. Of how much larger extent is the rule of duty or of good cffices, than that of legal right? How many things are there vhich piety, humanity, liberality, justice, fidelity require, vhich yet are not within the compass of the public statutes? — Quafn angusta innocentia est ad 'legem bonum esse? Quanto latius officiorum patet quam juris regula? Quam

This also is the scheme of the author of the book De TEsprit, who makes the law of the state to be the only rule and measure of virtue and duty, and what he calls a good legislation to be the only means of promoting it.

Chap, III. Civil Laws no adequate Rules of Morals, 39

multa pietas, humanitas, liberalitas, justitia, fides exigunt, quse omnia extra publicas tabulas sunt (m)?"

But let us more particularly, enquire into the most cele- brated civil laws and institutions among those that have been accounted the most civilized and best policed nations.

The Egyptians were antiently much admired for the wisdom of their laws, which were looked upon to be well fitted for the maintenance of public order: but they were far from furnishing adequate rules of virtue, and were, in some respects, greatly deficient. There is a passage of Porphyry, which has been thought to give an advantageous idea of the Egyptian morality. He informs us, that when they embalmed the body of any of the nobles, they were wont to take out the belly, and put it into a chest; and then holding up the chest towards the sun, one of the em- balmers.made an oration or speech in the name of the de- funct person; which contained the dead man's apology for himself, and the righteousness on the account of which he prayed to be admitted to the fellowship of the eternal gods. " O Lord the Sun, and all ye gods that give life to men, receive me, and admit me to the fellowship of the eternal gods: for whilst I lived in the world, I religiously wor-

(m) Sen. de Ira. lib. ii. cap. 27. The learned bishop of Glou- cester has set this matter in a very clear light, in his Divine Legation of Moses, vol. I. book i Sect. 2. p. 13, et seq. where he shews, that the laws of civil society, alone considered, are insufficient to prevent or cure moral disorders; that they can have no further efficacy than to restrain men from open trans- gressions; nor can their influence be extended thus far in all cases; especially where the irregularity is owing to the violence of the sensual passions: they also overlook what are called the duties of imperfect obligation, such as gratitude, hospitality, charity, &c. though these duties are of considerable importance in the moral character-

40 Concerning the Egyptian Laws and Customs, Part II.

shipped the gods which my parents shewed me: those that generated my body I always honoured: I neither killed any man, nor fraudulently took away any thing that was com- mitted to my trust; nor have I been guilty of any other very heinous or inexpiable wickedness; if in my life-time I offended in eating or drinking any of the things which it was not lawful for me to eat or drink; the offence was not committed by myself, but by these;" pointing to the chest, which contained his belly and entrails, and which was then thrown into the river: after which, the rest of the body was embalmed as pure. Porphyry cites for this Euphantus, who translated this prayer or oration out of the Egyptian tongue (n). This may seem to have been well contrived to point out the most eminent parts of a virtuous life and character, which tended to recommend a man to the divine favour. But it is to be observed, that the sun is here ad- dressed to as the Sapreme Lord, together with other gods, who are represented as the authors and givers of life: and that the first and principal thing here mentioned as a proof of the person's piety is, his having worshipped the gods which his parents had shewn him. And what kind of deities they were which the Egyptians worshipped is generally known. So that they were wrong with respect to the fun- damental principle of morality, the knowledge and worship of one true God. A late learned and ingenious author has shewn, that though the Egj^ptians had some ver}- good con- stitutions, there reigned in their government a multitude of abuses and essential defects, authorized by their laws, and the fundamental principles of their state. There were great indecencies and impurities in many of their public establish- ed rites and ceremonies of religion. It was permitted among them for brothers and sisters to marrv^ one another. There

(n) Porph. de Abstin. lib. iv. sect. 10,

Chap. III. Concerning the Grecian Laws and Customs. 41

is a law of theirs mentioned by Diodorus Siculus, lib, i, cap. 9. p. 69. edit. Amst. and by Aulus Gellius, lib. ii, cap. 20. which, under pretence of making it easy for the citizens to recover what was stolen from them, really en- couraged and authorized theft: it not only assured the thieves of impunity, but of a reward, by given them the fourth part of the prize, upon their restoring that which they had stolen (o). The same author observes, that the Egyptians were universally cried out against for their want of faith and honesty, as he shews from many testimonies (/? ). And Sextus Erapiricus informs us, that among many of the Egyptians, for women to prostitute themselves was ac- counted evxXea^ a glorious or honourable thing (^).

It is universally acknowledged, that the Greeks were amongst the most knowing and civilized nations of anti- quity. There ^ the most celebrated philosophers and mo- ralists opened their schools, and among them learning, and the arts, eminently flourished. Accordingly, they had a very high opinion of their own wisdom, and looked upon the rest of the world as much inferior to them, and to whom they gave the common title of Barbarians. Let us see therefore whether their laws and constitutions bid fair- er for improvement in morals, than those of other nations. Some of their wisest men and legislators travelled into Egypt, and other parts of the east, to observe their laws, and transplant such as they most approved into their own. It has been already hinted, that the learned have observed a near affinity in some remarkable instances between the anticnt Attic laws, as also those of the twelve tables, and

(o) De rOrigine des Loix, des Arts, &c. torn. I. liv. i. art. 4. p. 49, et torn. III. p. 28. et p. 352. a la Haye 1758? (A) Ibid. p. 354.

(y) Pyrrh. Hypotyp. lib. iii. cap. 24. Vol. II. " F

42 The Grecian Laws and Customs in Part II.

those of Moses (r); which makes it probable, that the laws delivered to the Israelites, which were of a divine original, and were of greater antiquity than any of the laws of the Grecian states, were in several respects of great advantage to other nations. Excellent laws and constitutions there undoubtedly were in several of the Grecian republics: but if the best of them were selected, and formed into one code, they would be far from exhibiting a complete rule of morals. They were all, like the laws of other nations, fundamentally wrong in all that part of moral duty which relates to the service and adoration we owe to the one true God; and in several respects also in granting too great an indulgence to the sensual passions, and in making some im- portant points of morality give way to what they looked upon to be the interest of the state.

The laws of Lycurgus have been highly celebrated both by antients and moderns. Plutarch observes, that this law- giver was pronounced by the oracle the beloved of God, and rather a god than a man: that he stands an undeni- able proof, that a perfect wise man is not a mere notion and chimera, as some have thought, and has obliged the world with a nation of philosophers. He expresses a high admiration of the Lacedaemonian institutions, as excellent- ly fitted to form men to the exercise of virtue, and to maintain and to promote mutual love among the citizens.

(r) ^ee Sam Petit. Comment, in Leg. Attic, printed at Paris 1635. See also Grot, in Matt. v. 28. et de Verit. Rel. Christ, lib. i, sect. 15. p. 28. edit. Cleric. It is true, i hat Mr. Le Clerc, in a note which he has there added, supposes, after Dr. Spenser, that both the Athenians and the Hebrews derived the laws Gro- tius refers to from the Egyptians. But no authorities can be pro- duced to shew that the E.i^yptians had such laws, but what are much posterior to the time of Moses.

Chap. III. many instances contrary to g-ood Morals, 43

He prefers them to the laws of all the other Grecian states, and observes, that all those who have written well of poli- tics, as Plato, Diogenes, Zen©, and others, have taken Ly- curgus for their model: and that Aristotle himself highly extols him, as having deserved even greater honours then the Spartans paid him, though they offered sacrifices to him as to a god (*). Many of the moderns, and among others the celebrated Mons. de Montesquieu professeth himself a great admirer of the laws of Lycurgus. He observes, that he promoted virtue by means which seemed contrary to it (t). But I think there are several of his laws and institu- tions to which this observation cannot justly be applied; and which, instead of promoting the practice of virtue, counter- acted it in important instances. Some of his admirers have acknowledged, that his laws vvere all calculated to establish a military con^monwealth, and that every thing was looked upon as just, which was thought to contribute to that end. Plato observes, in his first book of laws, that they were fit- ted rather to render men valiant than just. Aristotle makes the same observation (w). And Plutarch owns, that some person blamed the laws of Lycurgus as well contrived to make men good soldiers, but very defective in civil justice and honesty. It appears from the testimony of several au- thors, as well as from some remarkable facts, that they were for sacrificing probity and every other consideration, to what they thought the good of the state required; and judged every method lawful which might procure them suc-

(s) See Plutarch's Life of Lycurgus, especially at the latter end.

(/) L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. livre iv. ch. 6. p.^49, 50. Edit. Edinb.

(w) Arist. PoliUc. lib. ii. cap. 9. p. 331. et lib. vii. cap. \4. p. 443. Oper. torn. II. edit. Paris,

44 The Grecian Laws and Customs in Part II*

cess. The breach of faith cost them nothing. Herodotus says, that they who were acquainted with the genius of of that people knew that their actions were generally contrary to their words, and that they could not depend upon them in any matter {x). And though they were undoubtedly very brave, yet they valued a victory more which was gained by deceit and guile, than one that was obtained by open valour. How haughtily and cruelly, as well as perfidiously, did they behave towards Athens and Thebes, and all those whom they thought it their interest to oppress!

Many of their laws and customs were contrary to hu- manity. And the rigour of their discipline tended in seve- ral instances to stifle the sentiments of tenderness and bene- volence, of mercy and compassion, so natural to the human breast. I have in the former part of this Work, chap. vii. taken notice of their custom of whipping boys, even to death, at the altar of Diana Orthia. To which it may be added, that their young men and boys were wont to meet and fight with the utmost rage and fierceness on certain days of the year; of which Cicero says he himself was witness (?/). But nothing ccnild exceed their cruelty to their slaves, the helotes, as they called them, who laboured the ground for them, and performed all their works and manufactures. These slaves could have no justice done them, whatever insults or injuries they suff'ered. They were regarded as the slaves not merely of one particular mas- ter, but of the public, so that every one might injure them with irhpunity. Not only did they treat them in their gene- ral conduct with great harshness and insolence, but it was part of their policy to massacre them, on several occasions, in cold blood, and without provocation. Several authors

(x) Herod, lib. ix. n. 51. Francof. 1605.

(y) Tuscul. Disput. lib. v. cap. 27. p. 401. edit. Davis.

Chap. III. in many instances contrary to good Morals, 45

have mentioned their k^vk^iu^ so called from their lying in ambuscade, in thickets and clefts of rocks, from which thev issued out upon the helotes,^and killed all they met; and sometimes they set upon them in the open day, and mur- dered the ablest and stoutest of them, as they were at work in the fields. The design of this was to prevent their slaves from growing too numerous or powerful, which might en- danger the state. But as M. de Montesquieu very proper- ly observes, the danger was only owing to their cruel and unjust treatment of them; whereas among the Athenians, who treated their slaves with great gentleness, there is no instance of their proving troublesome or dangerous to the public (2). Plutarch is loth to believe that this inhuman custom was instituted by Lycurgus, though he does not de- ny that it was in use among the Lacedaemonians. But Aris- totle says, it was an institution of Lycurgus. And who- ever duly considers the spirit of several of his laws, will not think him incapable of it. And from the same cruel policy it was, that, as Thucydides informs us, they destroy- ed two thousand of the helotes, whom they had armed, when the exigences of the state required it, and who had served them bravely and faithfully in their wars.

Anotlier instance of the inhumanity of the laws of Ly- curgus was this. The father was obliged bv the laws to bring his child to a certain place appointed for that purpose, to be examined by a committee of the men of that tribe to which he belonged. Their business was carefully to view the infant, and if they found it deformed, and of a bad constitu- tion, they caused it to be cast into a deep cavern near the mountain Taygetus, as thinking it neither good for the child itself, nor for the public, that it should be brought up.

(2) L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i, liv. xy. chap. 16. p. 356f 357.

46 The Grecian Laws and Customs in Part II.

Plutarch, who takes notice of this, passes no censure upon it. And he pronounces in general, at the conclusion of his life of Lycurgus, that he could see no injustice, or want of equity, in any of that lawgiver's institutions.

Many have taken notice of that constitution of his, by which the Spartan boys were trained up to dextrous thiev- ing. They were obliged to steal their victuals, or be without them; which put them upon watching oppoitunities, and seizing what they could lay their hands on. It behoved them to do this with dexterity and activity; for if they were taken in the fact, they were whipped most unmercifully; not for stealing, as Sextus Empiricus observes, but for being catched (a). This was designed to sharpen their invention, and to exercise their agility and courage. Some authors, and among others, the celebrated Mr. Rollin, in his An- tient History, are of opinion, that this could not be called theft, because it was allowed by the state. But, I think, it cannot be denied, that in this method the youth were early enured to arts of rapine, and were taught to think there was no great hurt in invading another man's property, and to form contrivances for that purpose.

Notwithstanding all the austerity which appeared in the laws of Lycurgus, there were some of his constitutions, which seemed to be very little consistent with modesty and decency. There were common baths in which the men and women bathed together. And it was ordered, that the young maidens should appear naked in the public exercises, as well as 'the young men, and that they should dance naked with them at the solemn festivals and sacrifices (b)-. and as

(a) Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. lib. iii. cap. 24.

{b) That eminent philosopher Plato, in forming the model of a perfect commonwealth, proposed the laws of Lycurgus, in this and other instances, for his pattern, as I shall have occasion to

Chap. III. many instances contrary to good Mordh. 4,f

to married women, Lycurgus allowed husbands to impart the use of their wives to handsome and deserving men, in order to the begetting healthy and vigorous children for the commonwealth. It is a little odd to observe that learned and grave philosopher Plutarch endeavouring to justify these constitutions, in his Life of Lycurgus. That lawgiver was

observe afterwards. Thus neither the philosopher nor lawgiver shewed any great regard to the rules of modesty and purity. A remarkable proof this, that the erieatesi men among the Pagans, when left to their own judgments in matters of morality, were apt to form wrong notions concerning it, even in instances where one should think the dictates of nature and reason might have given them better directions. It may not be improper, on this occasion, to mention an observation of an eminent political wri- ter, Mons. de TMontesquieu. He observes, that all nations are agreed in looking upon the incontinence of women as a thing that deserves contempt: and he supposes that " a natural mo- desty is implanted in women, as a defence and preservative against incontinence: that therefore it is not true, that inconti- nence follows the laws of nature: i; violates those laws: and on the contrary, it is modesty and reservedness that follows those laws." He adds, that " where the physical force of certain cli- mates carries persons to violate the natural law of the two sexes, and that of intelligent beings, it is the business of the magistrate to make civil laws, which may overcome the nature of the cli- mate, and re-establish the primitive laws of nature*.*' According to this way of reasoning, a legislator is much to be blamed, who, like Lycurgus, establishes constitutions which tend to break down that natural fence of modesty, which is designed as a pre- servative against incontinence. In this certainly M. de Mon- tesquieu has judged much better than another writer of the same nation, the author of the book De TEsprit, who seems to make the great art of legislation to consist in giving a loose to the most licentious inclinations, and proposes the indulgence of them as a reward to merit, and an incentive to the noblest actions.

* L'Esprit des l^oix, vol. I. liv. xvi. chap. 12. p. S73, 374.

48 Some of the Grecian Laws and Customs Part II.

for sacrificing modesty, and the sanctity of the marriage- bed, to what he thought was for the benefit of the state. But these constitutions had, as might reasonably have been expected, a very bad influence upon their morals. The Spar- tan women were accounted the most immodest and licen- tious of any in Greece, as Aristotle observes (c).

I shall conclude this account of the Lacedaemonians, and of their laws and customs, with the account given of them by a late ingenious author: that they were a people proud, imperious, deceitful, perfidious, capable of sacrificing every thing to their ambition and their interest, and who had no esteem of the liberal arts and sciences. And after some other strokes of the like nature, he concludes, " Such were the manners and the genius of a people admired and pro- posed by all profane antiquity as a pattern of wisdom and virtue. — Telles etoient les mceurs et le genie d'un peuple admire, ei; propose, par toute I'antiquite profane, comme un modele de sagesse et de vertu (^)."

The law and custom of exposing children, so contrary to the dictates of nature and humanity, was not peculiar to Lacedaemon, but was common in other parts of Greece, as well as among other nations. And it is reckoned as a sin- gular thing among the Thebans, that the law forbade any Theban to expose his infant under pain of death (e). Even the most eminent philosophers, in their treatises of laws, prescribed or approved this unnatural practice. Plato would have it ordered by law, that men or women, who are past the age of getting and conceiving strong children, should take care that their offspring, if they should have any, should not come to the birth, or see the light; or if that

(c) Arisi. Politic, lib. ii. cap. 9.

(rf) De I'Origine des Loix, des Arts, &c. torn. III. p. 380.

(e) iElian. Histor. var. lib. ii. cap. 7.

Chap. III. in many instances contrary to good Morals, 49

should happen, they should expose them without nourish- ment (/). Aristotle expressly says, that it should be a law not to bring up or nourish any child that is weak or maimed: and that when the law of the country forbids to expose in- fants, it is necessary to limit the number of those that should be begotten: and if any one begets children above the num- ber limited by the laws, he advises to procure abortion before the foetus has life and sense (^). Justly is this men- tioned by Mr. Locke, as a remarkable instance to shew, that reason had failed mankind in a perfect rule, and resolv- ed not the doubts that had risen amongst the studious and thinking philosophers; nor had been able to convince the most civilized parts of the world, that they had not given^ nor could without a crime take away the lives of their chil- dren, by exposing them (/^)."

But what I would especially take notice of as a palpable proof of the great corruption of the Greeks, both in their notions and practice, with regard to morals, is, that the most unnatural filthiness was countenanced and encouraged in several places, by their public laws, and almost every where by their known customs.

It is a charge that has been often brought against them, that they were very much addicted to the impure love of boys. I am sensible there is a great authority against it. The learned Doctor, afterwards Archbishop Potter, in his excellent Greek Antiquities, has taken great pains to clear them from that charge; and seems willing to have it thought, that the love of boys, so generally allowed and practised

(/) Plato Republ. lib. v. Oper. p. 461. edit. Lugd.

^) Arist. Politic, lib. vii. cap. 16. Oper. torn. II. p. 447. edit. Paris.

Qi) Locke's Reason, of Christ, in his Works, vol. II. p. 534. edit. 3d.

Vot. IL G

50 The Grecian Laws and Customs in Part II.

among them, was perfectly innocent and virtuous. And it were to be wished, for the honour of human nature, that it could be proved to be so. I am far from saying, that the love of boys, for which the Greeks were so noted, was uni- versally of the criminal and vicious kind. But that this most abominable and unnatural vice was very common among them, and, in some of their cities and states, encou- raged by their laws, admits of a clear proof. There need no other vouchers for it, than the authors produced by this learned writer himself. One of these authors is Maximus Tyrius. And it is observable, that, at the end of his tenth dissertation, he celebrates it as a most heroic act of Agesi- laus, a more glorious conquest than any he had achieved against the Persians, and as more to be admired than the fortitude of Leonidas, who died for his country, that being in love with a beautiful Barbarian boy, he suffered it to go no farther than looking at him, and admiring him (?). No- thing could be more impertinent and absurd than this en- comium on Agesilaus, if the Spartan love of boys was ge- nerally as pure and innocent as the same author in that very dissertation represents it. The testimonies of Xenophon and Plutarch are produced to shew that the love of boys at Sparta, and which was prescribed by the laws of Lycur- gus, was pure and laudable. But the prejudices these two

(?) Epictetus has a passage not unlike this in commendation of Socrates*s extraordinary virtue. " Go to- Socrates (says he) and see him lying by Alcibiades, yet slighting his youth and beauty. Consider what a victory he was conscious of obtaining! What an Olympic prize! So that, by heaven, one might justly salute him; Hail! incredibly great, universal victor!** If this shameful vice had not been extremely common, even at Athens, Socrates's ab- staining from it could not have been celebrated, as it is here by Epictetus, as an act of virtue that deserves the highest admira* tion. See Epictetus's Dissert, book ii. ch. 18. sect. 4.

Chap. III. many instances contrary to ^ood Morals. 51

great authors had in favour of the Lacedjemonians, the high opinion they entertained of their laws and customs, and their willingness to put the fairest colours upon them, is well known, and does not a little weaken the force of their testimony. It will soon appear, that Plutarch is not very consistent with himself in what he advances on this head. As to Xenophon, it is to be observed, that at the same time that he vindicates the Lacedaemonians, he represents that criminal love as very common among the Greeks, and in many places authorized by the laws: " I know (says he) that there are many who will believe nothing of this;" i. e. that the love of boys among the Spartans was innocent and virtuous; " nor do I wonder at it, the unnatural love of boys is become so common, that in many places it is esta- blished by the public laws." This testimony of Xenophon is very remarkable with regard to others of the Greeks, though he will not allow that the Lacedaemonians were guilty of it. But Plato, his contemporary, whose testimony must be allowed to be; of great weight, in his eighth book of laws, supposes that the masculine love, which he there condemns as contrary to nature, was allowed both among the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans (i). The excellent writer above-mentioned will by no means allow that the love of boys usual among the Cretans was criminal; and asserts, that nothing passed between them and their lovers that was contrary to the strictest rules of virtXie: for which he quotes Maximus Tyrius and Strabo, who tells us, that the Cretans professed that it is was not so much the exter- nal beauty of a boy, as his virtuous disposition, his courage and conduct, that recommended him to their love. And this might be the pretence they alleged; and in some in-

{k) Plato de Leg. lib. viii. Oper. p. 645. G. H. edit. Lugd.

52 The Laws and Customs among the Greeks Part II.

Stances might really be the case. But, I think whosoever impartially examines what Strabo says concerning it, will not be apt to look upon the love he there speaks of as very innocent. The whole turn of the passage seems to me to have a contrary appearance. And I find the learned and ingenious author De I'Origine des Loix, &c. looks upon it in the same light, and cites this very passage of Strabo to shew that unnatural lust was encouraged by the Cretan law. And Plutarch, at the same time that he represents the love of boys in use at Athens and Sparta as having nothing blameable in it, expressly condemns that sort of it in Crete, which they called by the name of u^TFuyfAoi (/), which is that very love which Strabo speaks of in the passage referred to (w). Plato, not only in the eighth bock of laws already cited, but in his first book of laws, blames the Cretans for masculine mixtures; and intimates, that they were wont to justify themselves by the example of Jupiter and Gany- mede (n). Aristotle tells us, that to prevent their having too many children, there was a law among the Cretans, for encouraging that sort of unnatural love (o).

It appears from some passages of Plutarch, that he was willing to liave it thought that the love of boys in use among the Greeis was a pure and generous affection: but at other times he makes acknowledgments which plainly shew the contrary. In his life of Pelopidas, he tells us, that the legislators encouraged the love of boys, to temper the manners of their youth, and that it produced excellent effects, and particularly among the Thebans. But

(/) Plutarch, de liber, educandis, Oper. torn. II. p. 1 1. edit. Xyl. (m) Strabo, lib. x. p. 739, 740. edit. Amst. (n) Plato de Leg. lib. i. Oper. p. 569. G. edit. Lugd. 1590. (o) Arist. Politic, lib. ii. cap. 10. Oper. torn, II. p. 333. A. edit. Paris. 1629.

Chap. III. contrary to ^ood Morals. 58

the same great philosopher, who undoubtedly was inclined to give a favourable account of the Thebans whose coun- tryman he was, in his treatise De liberis educandis, ex- pressly declares, that such masculine loves were to be avoided, as were in use at Thebes and Elis {p). And his joining Thebes with Elis shews that it is a very criminal passion he speaks of. For we have the testimony of Maxi- mus Tyrius, in that dissertation in which he endeavours to vindicate some of the Grecian states from the charge, that the Elians encouraged that licentiousness, as he calls it, by a law (q). Nothing can be more evident than it is from Plutarch's treatise called 'e^^t/xo? or Amatorius, that this abominable vice had made a great progress among the Greeks, and was openly countenanced and pleaded for. One of his dialogists there argues for it at large, and highly commends it.^ He represents th« Lacedaemonians, Bseotians, Cretans, and Chalcidians, as much addicted to it. And ano- ther of his dialogists, who, it is to be supposed, expresses Plutarch's own sentiments, condemns it in very strong terms, and shews its pernicious effects. Athenseus tells us, that it was not only practised, but encouraged and promoted in many of the cities of Greece (r). At Athens indeed there was a law against it. And Plutarch seems to recom- mend the love of boys in use at Sparta and Athens as vir- tuous, and worthy to be emulated, though he condemns that at Thebes and Elis (*). As to Sparta, the accounts ^iven of it by antient authors, and by Plutarch himself, seem to vary. But, whatever might have been the ori- ginal design of the constitution established by Lycurgus,

(/z) Plutarch, ubi supra, p. 1 1. [ {q) Max. Tyr. Dissert. 10. p. 128. Oxon. 1677. (r) Deipnosoph. lib. xiii. p. 602. edit. Lugd. (s) Plutarch, ubi supra.

54 The Laxvs and Customs among the Greeks Part II.

with respect to it, these is too much reason to think, that, as it was generally practised among the Lacedaemonians, it was not very innocent. With regard to the Athenians, Plu- tarch tells us concerning their great lawgiver Solon, that it appears from his poems, that he was not proof against beautiful boys, and had not courage enough to resist the force of love. He observes, that he was in love with Pisis- tratus, because of his extraordinary handsomeness: and that by a law he forbade paederasty or the love of boys to slaves; making that, as Plutarch observes, an honourable and repu- table action; and as it were inviting the worthy to the prac- tice of that which he commanded the unworthy to for- bear (^). And in his Amatorius above referred to, he introduces Protogenes, one of his dialogists, arguing in favour of that practice, from this constitution of Solon (u), Maximus Tyrius, who takes a great deal of pains to vindi- cate Socrates from that charge, owns, that at the time when this philosopher flourished, this vicious passion had arrived to the greatest height, both in the other parts of Greece, and particularly at Athens; and that all places were full of unjust or wicked lovers, and boys that were enticed and delud- ed (;c). So that if there was a law against it at Athens, it seems to have been little regarded.

To the testimonies which have been produced may be added that of Cicero, who represents that practice as very common among the Greeks: and that what helped to intro- duce and spread it, was the custom of the youths appearing ivaked in the public exercises. And he . observes, that their poets, great men, and even their learned men and philoso-

Q) Plutarch. See Plutarch's Life of Solon, at the beginning, (w) Plutarch. Oper. torn. II. p. 751. edit. Xyland. (x) Max. Tyr. dissert. 10. initio.

Chap. III. contrary to ^odd Morals. SS

phers, not only practised, but gloried in it (i/). And accord- ingly he elsewhere represents it as the custom, not of parti- cular cities only, but of Greece in general. Speaking of the things that might be thought to contribute to Dionysius'a happiness, he mentions his having paramours of that kind " according to the custom of Greece. — Habebat, more Graecise, quosdam adolescentes amore conjunctos (2)." And in a passage cited by Lactantius, he mentions it as a bold and hazardous thing in the Greeks, that they consecrated the images of the Loves and Cupids in the places of their public exercises (cr).

I have insisted the more largely upon this, because there cannot be a more convincing proof, that the laws and cus- toms, even in the most learned and civilized nations, are not to be depended upon as proper guides in matters of mo- rality. The Greeks are regarded and admired as the most eminent of the Pagan nations, for their knowledge in phi- losophy, and especially in morals, and as having cultivated their reason in an extraordinary degree. They valued them- selves mightily upon their wisdom, and the excellency of their laws; and yet their laws or generally allowed customs, shewed that they were become amazingly corrupt, both in their notions and practices, with regard to morals; and that in instances, as to which one would have thought the light of nature would have given them a sufficient direction. I say, they were beccme very corrupt in their notions as well as practices. For though some of them acknowledge the

(y) Tuscul. Disput. lib. iv. cap. 33.

(2) Ibid. lib. V. cap. 20. p. 385. edit. Davis.

(a) " Magnum Cicero audaxque consilium susccpisse Grae- ciam dicit, quod Cupidinum et Amorum simulachra in gymnasiis consecrasset," Lactant. Divin. Instit. lib. i. cap, 20. p. 106. luUgd. Bat. 1660.

$9 The Laws and Customs, £s?c. Part IL

evil and turpitude of that unnatural vice, yet, in the general opinion, it seems to have passed among them for no fault at all, or a very light one. And many of their philosophers and moralists, as I shall have occasion to shew afterwards, represented it as a matter perfectly indifferent. Barolesanes, an antient and learned writer, in a large extract quoted from him by Eusebius, after having mentioned some bar- barous nations, which were much addicted to that vice, and others who had it in abhorrence, observes, that in Greece such kind of masculine loves were not accounted disgrace- ful, even to the wise (<^). St. Paul, therefore, in drawing up the charge of an amazing corruption of morals in the Hea- then world, very justly put this in the first place, as being both of the highest enormity, and very common not only among the people, but the philosophers themselves. Nor is it probable, that any thing less than a Divine Law, en- forced by the authority of God himself, and by the most ex- press denunciations of the Divine Wrath and Vengeance against such crimes, could have over-ruled the force of such inveterate custom and example, countenanced by the maxims and practice of those who made high pretences to wisdom and reason.

(d) Euseb. Prgep. Evangel, lib. vi. cap. 10. p. 276. D,

57

CHAPTER IV.

Farther instances of civil laws and customs among the Pagan nations. Those of the antient Romans considered. The laws of the twelve tables, though mighti- ly extolled, were far from exhibiting a complete rule of morals. The law of Romulus concerning the exposing of diseased and <leformed children. This continued to be practised among the Romans. Their cruel treatment of their slaves. Their gladiatory shows contrary to humanity. Unnatural lusts common among them as well as the Greeks. Observations on the Chinese laws and customs. Other laws and customs of nations mentioned, which are contrary to good morals.

From the Greeks let us pass to the Romans, whose good policy and gdvemment has been greatly admired, and who have been regarded as the most virtuous of all the Pa- gan nations. And it must be owned, that in the most antient times of the Roman state, they were free from those vices which luxury and efFeminancy are apt to produce. There were shining examples among them of probity, justice, fidelity, fortitude, a contempt of pleasures and riches, and love to their country. But the body of the people were rude and ignorant to a great degree, and sunk in an idolatry and superstition, than which nothing could be more gross and stupid. Their virtue was rough and savage: they made glory to consist chiefly in military bravery: and their love to their country was, for the most part, only a strong passion for rendering it the mistress of all others. To this they made every thing give way; and often broke through the rules of justice and equity, to promote what they thought the inte- rest of the state; jealous of any people, that were for pre- serving themselves in a state of liberty and in'Hependency. To which it may be added, that they were for a long time without a written code of laws. And the people suffered 69 Vol. II. H

58 The Immoral Laws and Customs Part IL

much by the injustice, insolence, and arbitrary oppression of their magistrates and great nnen, even in what are ac- counted the most virtuous times of the republic, that they insisted very justly upon having a written body of laws, which should be the standing rule of judgment. This was accordingly accomplished. Select persons were chosen to collect and compile laws for the commonwealth, who tra- velled into Greece for that purpose; and with great sagacity chose the best institutions of the Grecian states, and other nations. Hence came the famous laws of the twelve tables, which have been so much celebrated both by antients and moderns. Cicero, who was certainly a very able judge, fre- quently speaks of them in terms of the highest approbation. And particularly, in his first book De Oratore, in the person of that great lawyer and orator L. Crass us. He not only prefers them to all other civil laws and constitutions, par- ticularly to those of the Greeks, but to all the writings of the philosophers. He makes no scruple to declare, that though all men should be displeased at him for it, he would freely own it as his opinion, "That the single book of the twelve tables was superior to the libraries of all the philosophers, both in the weight of its authority, and in the abundant utility arising from it (c)."

But however those laws might deserve great praise, considered as good civil constitutions, I believe there are few that will pretend, that they exhibited a perfect rule of morals, or gave men a clear and full direction as to every branch of their duty. That part of those laws which related

(c) " Fremant omnes licet, dicam quod sentiam, bibliothecas omnium philosophorum, unus mihi videtur duodecim tabularum libellus, siquis legum fontes et capita viderit, et auihoritatis pon- dere et ulilitatis ubertate superare." Cic. de Orat. lib. i. cap, 42, 43.

Chap. IV. amoxig the antient Romans. 59

to sacred things, was evidently calculated, like the laws of other Heathen nations, to uphold the public idolatry and polytheism. The body of these laws was designed to regu- late the conduct of the citizens towards the public, and to- wards one another, to settle men's private righis, and to be the rule of judgment for the regulation of the civil policy, and for the security and advantage of the state. And many of their constitutions were undoubtedly excellent, taken in this view; but, like other civil laws, could be of no great force tor regulating the inward temper and dispositions of the mind. Mons. de Montesquieu observes, that there was an extreme severity in several of their laws, suitable to the rudeness and rigidity of the antient Romans. The law con- cerning debtors is mentioned by several authors, and was remarkable for its inhumanity. The creditor was allowed to keep the debtor in close confinement sixty days; and after- wards, in case he did not pay the debt within the time prescribed by the law, or find sufficient security, he was condemned to lose his head, or to be sold as a slave. This might seem to be severe enough, but the law went farther still, and permitted the creditors, if there were several of them, to cut the dead body of the debtor in pieces, and divide it among them. Nothing can excuse the barbarity of this law, even supposing it to have been designed only in terrorem. And indeed the last part of it was so shocking that we are told there was no instance of its being put in execution, but it fell, and was abrogated by disuse (^).

Dionysius Halicarnasseus, who was a great admirer of the institutions ot the antient Romans, informs us, that Romulus obliged the citizens to bring up all their male children, and the eldest of the females. They were allowed,

( c/) Quintilian takes notice of this law, lib. v. cap. 6. So does A. Gellius. And Tertullian refers to it, Apol. cap. 4.

€0 The immoral Laws and Customs Part I L

therefore, to destroy all their female children but the eldest. And even Avith regard to their male children, if they were deformed or monstrous, he permitted the parents to expose them, after having shewn them to five of their nearest neighbours (e). There is a passage in Cicero's third book of laws, from which it has been concluded, that the law of Romulus with regard to the exposing and destroying male children that were remarkably deformed, was confirmed by a constitution of the twelve tables (/"). A very learned writer has taken notice of a remarkable passage in Terence, from which it appears, that this inhuman custom of exposing and destroying children, especially females, was not un- common, even among parents of the best characters. After having observed, that " of all the moral painters, Terence is he who seems to have copied human nature most ex- actly," he adds, that " yet his man of universal benevo- lence, whom he draws with so much life in that masterly- stroke. Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto, is the same person who commands his wife to expose his new- born daughter, and flies into a passion with her, for having committed that hard task to another, by which means the infant escaped death.-— Si meum imperium exequi voluisses, interemptam oportuit. — And he [Chremes] characterizes such who had any remains of this natural instinct as persons —qui neque jus, neque bonum atque sequum sciunt (^)." Such were the sentiments published with applause on the Roman theatre. And it appears from a passage of Seneca, that s6 late as in his time, it was usu-al among the Romans

(e) Dion. Halic. Roman Antiquities, lib. ii.

(/) Cic.de Leg. lib. iii. cap. 8. p. 207. where see Dr. Davis's note.

(^r) Divine Legation of Moses, vol. L book i. sect. 4. p. 58. xnarg. note, edit. 4th.

Chap. IV. among the antient Romans, 61

to destroy weak and deformed children. " Portentosos foetus extinguimus: liberos quoque, si debiles monstrosique editi sunt, mergimus (^)."

The cruelty of the Lacedaemonians towards their slaves has been taken notice of. The laws and customs of the Ro- mans, with respect to them, were little better. It was not unusual for the masters to put their old, sick, and infirm slaves into an island in the Tyber, where they left them to perish. And so far did some of them carry their luxury and wantonness, as to drown their slaves in the fish-ponds, that they might be devoured by the fish, to make their flesh more delicate (i). The custom of gladiatory shows, which obtained universally among the Romans, even when they were famous for the politer arts, and were thought to give a pattern of good government to other nations, was also contrary to tlie rules of humanity. They were exhibited at the funerals of great and rich men, and on many other oc- casions, by the Roman consuls, praetors, aediles, senators, knights, priests, and almost all that bore great offices in the state, as well as by the emperors; and in general by all that had a mind to make an interest with the people, who were extravagantly fond of those kind of shows. Not only the men, but the women ran eagerly after them, who were, by the prevalence of custom, so far divested of that compas- sion and softness which is natural to the sex, that they took a pleasure in seeing them kill one another, and only desired that they should fall genteelly, and in an agreeable attitude. Such was the frequency of those shows, and so great the number of men that were killed on these occasions, that Lipsius says, no war caused such slaughter of mankind,

(A) Sen. de Ira, lib. i. cap. 15. (t) See L'Esprit, disc. 2. chap. 24.

62 The immoral Laws and Customs Part II.

as did these sports of pleasure, throughout the several pro- vinces of the vast Roman empire.

That odious and unnatural vice, which (as has been shewn) prevailed so much in Greece, was also common among the Romans, especially in the latter times of their state. Many passages might be produced from their poets, which plainly refer to it. To which I shall add what a learned author observes, that " Cicero introduces, without any mark of disapprobation, Cotta, a man of the first rank and genius, freely and familiarly owning to other Romans of the same quality, that worse than beastly vice, as prac- tised by himself, and quoting the authority of antient phi- losophers in vindication of it (>^)." It appears from what Seneca says, in his 95th epistle, that in his time it was practised at Rome openly, and without shame. He there speaks of flocks and troops of boys, distinguished by their colours and nations; and that great care was taken to train them up for that detestable employment (/).

It is not necessary to add any thing more to shew, that among the Greeks and Romans, the most celebrated nations in the antient Pagan world, their laws and constitutions, though in many respects excellent, were far from exhibiting a

(k) Dr. Tailour*s Notes and Paraphrase on the Epistle to the Romans, on chap. i. 26. " Quotus enim quisque formosus est? Athenis cum essem, e gregibus Ephseborum vix singuli reperie- bantur^ Video quid subriseris. Sed tamen ita se res habet. Deinde nobis, qui concedentibiis philosophis adolesceniulis de- lectamur, etiam vitia ssepe jucunda sunt." And he immediately after mentions Alcgeus's being pleased with a blemish in the boy he was in love with; and Q. Catulus's being in love with Roscius, who had distorted eyes. Cic, de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. 28.

(/) " Puerorum infelicium greges, agmina exoletorum, per nationes coloresque descripta," &c. Ep. 95.

Chap. IV. among" the antient Romans. ©3

proper rule of morals to guide the people: they failed in very important instances: and some of the customs, which at length became very prevalent among them, were of a most immoral nature and tendency, and shewed them to be sunk into an amazing corruption and depravity of manners. It may not be improper^ on this occasion, to take notice of the Chinese, who have been mightily extolled for their antiquity, the extent of their empire, the wisdom and ex- cellency of their laws and constitutions, and the goodness of their morals. A noted author, who has distinguished himself by asserting the clearness and sufficiency of the Law and Religion of nature in opposition to Revelation, lays a particular stress upon this. He represents *' the in- fidels of China (as he calls them) as having the preference to Christians in regard to all moral virtues." And he tells us, from the famous Mr. Leibnitz, that " such is our growing corruption, that it may almost seem necessary to send some Chinese missionaries to teach us the use and practice of Natural Theology, as we send missionaries to them to teach them revealed Religion (?«)." But if we take their laws and constitutions in the most advantageous light, it must be owned, indeed, that they are well calcu- lated for preserving external public order and decency, and for the regulation of the civil polity, but are altogether in- sufficient to furnish a complete rule of morals, or to lead men into the practice of real piety and virtue, considered in its just extent. F. Navarette, who lived many years in China, and was well acquainted with their language, their laws, and books, and who seems to have given an honest and impartial account of them (n), says, that " he believes

(w) Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 366, 3^67. edit. 8vo.

(n) I do not find that Father Navarette's name appears in the

list of the authors, whose names are prefixed to F. Du Haiders

64 Immoral Customs among the Chinese Part II,

the outward behaviour is not taken care of so much in any part of the world, as it is in China: that whatever they do or say is so contrived, that it may have a good appear- ance, please all, and offend none: and that doubtless that nation excels all others in outward modesty, gravity, good words, courtesy, and civility (o)." Yet what he says of them in several parts of his book, gives one a very disad- vantageous idea of their morals. He represents the sin against nature as extremely common among them; and that in the time of the former Chinese emperors, there were public stews of this kind at Pequin, though not allowed by the Tartars (/>). That they do not look upon drunkenness to be a crime (^). That every one takes as many concu- bines as he can ketp (r). That many of the common peo- ple pawn their wives, and that some lend them for a month, or more, or less, according as they agree (5). That there are many things in China which make matrimony void, some of them very trifling. He quotes a book of great authority among them, in which it is said, concern- ing the antient wise men of China, who are there celebrated as men of greater sincerity and virtue than the moderns, that they turned away their wives, because the house was

History of China, and out of whose accounts he compiled his his- tory. But as he found fault with the wron^ and partial accounts given by several authors of the society, I suppose it was thought proper to take no notice of him; though he well deserved to have been mentioned among the best of- those who have given accounts of China.

(0) See Navarette's Account of the Empire of China, book ii. chap. 6. p. 122, 123. in the first volume of Churchiirs Collec- tion.

{fi ) ibid, book i. chap. 13. p. 29. and book ii. p. 68.

(g) Ibid, book i. chap. 14.

(r) Ibid, book ii. chap 7. p. 68,

\s) Ibid.

CiiAP. IV. and othef- antient Heathen Nations. 65

full of smoke, or because they frightened the dog With their disagreeable noises And that the antients dissolved the knot of matrimony without a word speaking. In the same book it is determined, that when the wife is turned off, the husband may marry another (?). F. Navarettei farther observes, that the Chinese sell their sons and daughters when they please, and do it frequently (w). But what is still worse, very many of them, rich as well as poor, when they are delivered of daughters, stifle and kill them. Those who are more tender-hearted leave them un- der a vessel, where they let them die in great misery: of which he gives a most affecting instance to his own know- ledge. And he says it was the common opinion that there were about ten thousand female children murdered every year within the precincts of the City Lao Ki, where he lived some time. " How many then (says he) must we imagine perished throughout the whole empire (^)?" Yet^ he says, " all the sects among them, except that of the learned, think it a siii to kill living creatures: they plead humanity and compassion, thinking it a cruel thing to take that life which they cannot give. But it is very well worth remarking (says he) that they should endeavour to shew* themselves merciful to beasts, yet murder their own daugh- ters." He adds, that " in India they have hospitals for all sorts of irrational creatures, and yet they let men die with-* out assisting them in their sickness («/)." Many have talked of the brotherly affection and benevolence of the Chinese towards one another; but it appears from the same writer^

(?) Navarette*s Account of the Empire of Chink, book ii. chaf^^ 7. p. 67. {u) Ibid, book i. chap. 20. p. 47. (a?) Ibid, book ii. chap-l 0. p. 77, (y) Ibid, book ii. chap. 10. p. 77, Vol.. IL * I

66 Immoral Customs among the Chinese Part II.

that though they carry a fair appearance, and " are exqui- site at concealing the mortal hatred they bear any man for several years, yet, when an opportunity offers, they give full vent to it. It often happens, that in law suits, the de- fendant hangs himself, only to ruin and avenge himself of the plaintiff: for when he is hanged, all his kindred repair to the judge, complaining that he hanged himself to avoid the trouble and vexation the plaintiff put him to, having no other remedy left him. Then all join against the plaintiff, and the judge among them; and they never give over, till they ruin him and his family (2)." Father Trigaltius, and from him Cornelius a Lapide, say, concerning the Chinese, that "they wonderfully follow the track of nature and rea- son, and are courteous, and apt to learn, as well as ingeni- ous and great politicians, and therefore very capable of Christian wisdom,'* &c. F. Navarette, who mentions this, remarks upon it, that " if their being so addicted to super- stitions, sodomy, fraud, lying, pride, covetousness, sensu- ality, and other vices, is following the course of nature and reason, then that father was in the right («)." To what has been produced from F. Navarette, I would add, that an author of great reputation for political knowledge has ob- served, that " the Chinese, whose whole life is entirely go- verned by the established rites, are the most void of com-

(2) Navarette's Account of the Empire of China, book i. chap. 20. p.' 47. What Navarette here says concerning the litigiousness of the Chinese, is confirmed by the testimony of the Jesuits, who compiled the Scientia Sinesis Latine exposita. They observe that there is an infinite numi3er of law suits in China, and every where a thousand arts of cheating, of which all the tribunals are full. " Infinitus litium et uiigantium in Chin^ hodie est nu- merus; mille passim failendi fingendive, artes, quibus tribunalia omnia plena sunt." Scient. Sin. lib. i. p. 12.

(a) Ibid, book v. p. 173.

I

Chap. IV. and other antient Heathen Nations. 67

mon honesty of any people upon earth;— le peuple le plus fourbe de la terre;" and that the laws, though they do not allow them to rob or to spoil hy violence, yet permit them to cheat and to defraud (^). Agreeable to this is the charac- ter given of them in Lord Anson's Voyages, where there are striking instances of the general disposition that is among them to commit all kinds of fraud.

It were easy to produce several other laws and customs of different nations contrary to the rules of morality. Some nations there have been, among whom theft and robbery were accounted honourable. Others gave a full indulgence by law to all manner of impurity and licentiousness, both in men and women. Others, as the Persians, allowed the most incestuous mixtures. And there were several nations, among whom it was usual to expose and destroy their nearest friends and relatives, and even their parents, when they grew old and very sick, esteeming those to be most misera- ble that died a natural death (c). Eusebius gives several other instances of absurd and immoral laws and customs, which obtained among many people before the light of the

(b) L'Esprit des Loix, vol. I. liv. xix. chap. 17. p. 437. et ibid, chap. 20. p. 440, 441. edit. Edinb.

(c) The author of a late periodical paper, published at Paris, entituled, Le Conservateur, pleads in favour of the laws of those nations, which ordered old and infirm persons to be put to death. He pretends, that there is nothing in this but what is conform- able to reason, though he owns it is not reconcileable to the Gospel. And he thinks it would be fit and reasonable, to deter- mine by law the term beyond which persons should not be suf- fered to live. Le Conservateur for March 1757, as cited by the Abbe Gauchet, in his Lettres Critiques. An instancejhis, among many others that might be mentioned, of the extravagances men are apt to fall into, through a high opinion of ^heir own reason.

08 Farther Instances of immoral Laws and Part II.

Gospel shone amongst them. But he observes, that no sooner did any of them embrace Christianity', but they abandoned those laws and customs, which nothing could prevail with them to do before. And this he justly men^ tions as a proof of the happy effects produced by the Gos^ pel, in reforming the manners of men (d)»

The same learned father has a long extract from Barde* panes, an eminent antient writer, concerning the various customs and laws in different nations,, partly written, and partly unwritten, some of which were good and laudable, others of an immoral nature and tendency. It is too long to be transcribed here, but may be seen in the sixth book of Eusebius's Evangelical Preparation, cap. 10. p. 175. etseq. The reader may also consult Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhon* Hypotyp. lib. iii. cap. 24. and a modern author, who has made a large collection of absurd and shameful laws and customs in several nations, antient and modern, especially such as tend to encourage all manner of lewdness and de- bauchery (e). It is easy to observe that this last -mentioned writer enlarges upon some of those laws and customs which are contrary to all the rules of modesty and purity, in a manner which shews that he is far from disapproving them, ^nd seems rather to recommend them as models of a wise legislation. We may see by this what fine systems of legis- lation might be expected from some of those, who make the highest pretences to an extraordinary sagacity; and what an advantage it is, not to be left merely to what men's boast- ed reason, which is too often guided and influenced by their passions, would be apt to dictate in morals. ' J shall conclude what relates to the laws and customs of

(d) Praepar. Evangel, lib. i. cap. 4. p. 11, 12. edit. Paris. (^e) L'Esprit, tome I. disc. 2. chap. 14 et 15,

Chap. IV. Customs among the Pagan Nations, 6^

the Pagan nations, with observing, that Lord Bolingbroke, who, as hath been already hinted, seems to lay the principal stress on human laws, as furnishing the most effectual means for promoting and securing the practice of virtue, yet has thought fit to own, that " the law of nature has been blend- ed with many absurd and contradictory laws in all ages and countries, as well as with customs, which, if they were in- dependent on laws, have obtained the force of laws (y)." The same noble writer, who frequently represents the law of nature as universally clear and obvious to all mankind, has made this remarkable acknowledgment, that " the law of nature is hid from our sight by all the variegated clouds of civil laws and customs. Some gleams of true light may be seen through them, but they render it a dubious light, and it can be no better to those who have the keenest sight, till those interpositions are removed (^)»" It may not be improper here to add a passage or two from a celebrated antient, relating to civil laws. Cicero declares, that " the commands and prohibitions of human laws have not a suf- ficient force, either to engage men to right actions, or avert them from bad ones. — Intelligi sic oportet, jussa ac vetita populorum vim non habere ad recte facta vocandi, et a peccatis avocandi (A)." And he pronounces, that " it would be the greatest folly to imagine, that all those things are just which are contained in popular institutions and laws.-^ lUud stultissimum existimare omnia justa esse, quae sita sunt in populorum institutis aut legibus (?)."

Thus it appears, with great evidence, that the civil laws

(/) Bolingbroke's Works, vol. V. p. 15. edit. 4to, \g) Ibid. vol. V. p. 105. edit. 4to. (/j) De Leg. lib. ii. cap. 4. {i) Lib. i. cap. 15.

70 Farther Instances of immoral Laws and Part II.

and constitutions in the Pagan world were far from afford- ing a safe and certain rule, which might be depended upon, for the direction of the people in moral duty.

As to the mysteries of which a very eminent writer has made a beautiful representation, as an excellent expedient contrived by the legislators and civil magistrates, for re- claiming the people from their idolatry and polytheism, and engaging them to a life of the strictest virtue, I need nof here add any thing to what is offered on this subject in the former volume (i). It is there shewn, that there is no suf- ficient reason to think that the mysteries were intended to detect the error of the vulgar polytheism, but rather, on the contrary, by striking shows and representations, to create a greater awe and veneration for the religion of their country. - And as to morals, notwithstanding the high pretensions of some Pagan writers, especially after Christianity had made some progress, it does not appear, that the original design of them went farther, than the humanizing and civilizing the people, and encouraging tht-m to the practice of those virtues, and deterring them from those vices, which more immediately affect society. It will scarce, I believe, be pre- tended, that admitting the most favourable account of the mysteries, the people were there instructed in a complete body of morals. But the truth is, there were great defects and faults in the original constitution of them, which na- turally gave occasion to corruptions and abuses, which be- gan early, and continued long; so that it is to be feared, the mysteries, as they were managed, greatly contributed to that amazing depravation of manners, which, like a deluge, overspread the Pagan world. It is observed by the cele- brated author above referred to, that " God, in punishment

(At) See vol. I. chap. viii. and ix.

Chap. IV. Customs among the Pagan Nations. 71

* for their turning his Truth into a lie,' suffered their mys- teries, which they erected for a school of virtue, to dege- nerate into an odious sink of vice and immorality, giving them up unto all uncleanness and vile affections (/)."

(/) Divine Legation of Moses, vol. I. book ii, sect. 4. p. 196, marginal note, edit. 4th.

72 Concerning Morality PartIL

CHAPTER V.

Concerning morality as taught by the antient Heathen philosophers. Some of them said excellent things concerning moral virtue, and their writings might in several respects be of great use. But they could not furnish a perfect rule of morals, that had sufficient certainty, clearness, and authority. No one philosopher, or sect of i)hilosoi)hcrs, can be absolutely depended upon as a proper guide in matters of morality. Nor is a complete system of morals to be extracted from the writings of them ali collectively considered. The vanity of such an attempt shewn. Their sentiments, how excellent soever, could not properly pass for laws to mankind.

T HOUGH the civil laws and constitutions, or those cus- toms which obtained the force of laws, in the Heathen world, could not furnish out a rule of morality, which might be depended upon, to guide men to the true know-= ledge and practice of moral duty in its just extent; yet it may be alleged, that the instructions and precepts of the philosophers were, if duly attended to, sufficient for that purpose. This is what many have insisted on, to shew that there was no need of an extraordinary Divine Revelation to give men a complete rule of moral duty. It is well known what praises many of the antients have bestowed on philo- sophy, and that they have particularly extolled its great usefulness and excellency with regard to morals. Cicero has several remarkable passages to this purpose (w). He says

(m) « Cultura animi philosophia est, haec extrahit vitia radi- citus: est profecto animi medicina philosophia, medetur animis: ab ea, si.et boni et beati volumus esse, omnia adjumenta et aux- ilia petemus bene beateque vivendi: vilioruni peccatorumque nostrorum, omnis a philosophia petenda correciio est. O vitae philosophia dux! virtutis indagatrix, expultrixque vitiorum! Quid non modo nos, sed omnino vita hominum, sine te esse po- tuissetl Tu inventrix legum, tu magistra morum et disciplinag

Chap. V. as taught by the Heathen Philosophers, 73

that " philosophy is the culture of the mind, and plucketh up vice by the roots; that it is the medicine of the soul, and healeth the minds of men: that from thence, if we would be good and happy, we may draw all proper helps and as- sistances for leading virtuous and happy livest that the cor- rection of all our vices and sins is to be sought for from philosophy." And he breaks forth into that rapturous en comium upon it: " O philosophy, the guide of life! the searcher out of virtue, and expeller of vice! What should we be, nay, what would the human life be without thee! Thou wast the inventress of laws, the mistress or teacher of manners and discipline. To thee we flee: from thee we beg assistance. And one day spent according to thy precepts is preferable to an immortality spent in sin." Seneca says, that *' philosophy is the study of virtue (72)." And some of the moderns have' come little behind the antients, in the admi- ration they have expressed for the Heathen moral philoso- phy.

I am far from endeavouring to detract from the praises which are justly due to the antient philosophers and moral- ists among the Pagans. Admirable passages are to be found in their writings. They speak nobly concerning the dignity and beauty of virtue, and the tendency it hath to promote the perfection and happiness of the human nature: and con- cerning the turpitude and deformity of vice, and the misery that attends it. They give useful and excellent directions as to many particular virtues, and shew the reasons upon

fuisti. Ad te confugimus: a te opem petemus. Est autem unus dies bene et ex praeceptis tuis actus, peccanti inimortalitati an- teponendus." See Cicero Tuscul. Dibput. lib. ii. cap. 4 et 5. lib. iii. cap. 3. lib. iv. cap. 38. but especially ibid. lib. v. cap. 2.

(n) " Philosophia studium virtutis est." Sen. epist. 89. et epist. 90.

Vol. II. K '

74 Pretence that the Gospel Moral Duty was Part II.

which they are founded, in a manner which tends to recom- mend them to the esteem and practice of mankind. And I doubt not some of them were useful instruments under the direction and assistance of Divine Providence, for preserv- ing among men an esteem and approbation of virtue, for strengthening and improving their moral sense, and giving them, in many instances, a clearer discernment of the moral reasons and differences of things.

But it will by no means follow from this, that therefore mankind stood in no need of a Divine Revelation, to set be- fore them a clear and certain rule of duty, in its just extent, and enforce it upon them by a Divine Authority. It hath been confidently asserted, by those that extol what they call Natural Religion in opposition to Revelation, that *' there is no one moral virtue, which has not been taught, explained and proved by the Heathen philosophers, both occasionally and purposely." And that " there is no moral precept in the whole Gospel, which was not taught by the philosophers (o)." The same thing has been said by other writers of a different character, and who assert the Divine Original and and Authority of the Gospel Revelation. The learned Dr. Meric Casaubon, in his preface to his translation of Antoni- nus's Meditations, expresses himself thus: '' I must needs sav, that if we esteem that natural, which natural men of best account, by the mere strength of human reason, hav^e taught and taken upon them to maintain as just and reason- able, I know not any evangelical precept or duty, belonging to a Christian's practice * (even the harshest, and those

(o) Bolingbroke's Works, Vol. V. p. 205, 206. 218. Edit. 4to.

(*) I cannot but regard it as a rash thing in any Christian Divine to say, as Df. Casaubon here does, that " there is not one evangelical precept or duty belonging to a Christian's practice"

Chap. V. taught by the Philosophers examined, tS

that seem to ordinary men most contrary to flesh and blood not excepted) but upon due search and examination will prove of that nature." In like ^manner, another learned and ingenious writer has lately asserted, that " there is not any one principle, or any one practice of morality, which may not be known by Natural Reason without Revelation. By Reason we may come at a certainty of the existence of God, and of his Providence, his Justice, Mercy, and Truth: by that we may trace out our duty to him, and may discover a future state of rewards and punishments: by that we may come at the knowledge of such truths as relate to our neighbours, and the corresponding duties to them: what we are to do in social life; how we are to behave towards go-

but what natural men, by the mere strength of human reason, have taught and taken upon them to maintain as just and reason- able; since all that believe the Gospel must own, that there is a part of duty which necessarily enters into the evangelical moral- ity, and belongs to the Christian practice, which yet cannot be pretended to have been taught by the antient Pagan Moralists; and that is, that part of Christian practice which immediately ariseth from the discoveries made to us in the Gospel of the Work of our Redemption: e.g. the duties of Love, Affiancci Subjection, and Obedience, which we owe to our Lord and Sa- viour Jesus Christ, and which are of such importance, that the Christian life is represented as a living to him who died for us and rose again. To which it may be added, that the living by that faith which is the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen, and the seeking and minding the thint^s which are above, did not, in any of the Pagan systems of morality, before the coming of our Saviour, necessarily enter into a good man*s character; whereas it must be now acknow- ledged to be essential to the Christian life, and^a necessary branch of Gospel holiness. Some other instances of evangelical duty will come to be considered afterwards, which were riot pre- scribed by the best moralists among the antient Pagans.

7Q Pretence that the Gospel Moral Duty xvas Part II.

vernors, and what obedience is to be paid in the civil state; wherein true happiness consists, and what it is that must lead to it; and what we ought to do in our private relations. These and such like points may be traced out by Natural Reason; nor do I know of any one point of duty towards God or man, but what reason will suggest, and supply us with proper motives to do it (/>)." He afterwards observes, that " as the powers of reason are sufficient in themselves to discover all and every duty, and likewise to discover proper and sufficient motives to do them. Revelation may- add many more; and if so, it must be deemed by them that have it a singular advantage (^)." We see here, that this learned writer asserts, that the powers of reason alone, with- out any assistance from Revelation, are sufficient to discov- er all and every duty towards God, our neighbours, and ourselves, and also to supply proper and sufficient motives to do them: and all that he leaves to Divine Revelation, is not to make a discovery of any part of our duty, but only to furnish some additional motives to duty, besides what the light of our own unassisted reason is able of itself to discover. I readily allow, that if Revelation did no more than this, it would yet be of great advantage to those that have it, and what they ought to be very thankful to the Di- vine Goodness for. But I cannot think this is all the bene- fit we have by Divine Revelation, and that it gives us no knowledge or information with respect to any part of the duty required of us, but what the light of Natural Reason was able clearly and certainly to discover, and actually did discover by its own unassisted strength. I join with the learned Doctor in the declaration he makes, that " there

(fi) Dr. Sykes's Principles and Connection of Natural and Re- vealed Religion, p. 108, 109. (q) Ibid. p. 110.

Chap. V. taught by the Philosophers examined, *;i*j

can be no surer way of knowing what Reason can discover, and what not, than by examining what proficiency was ac- tually made in moral knowlrfdge, by those who lived where Revelation was unknown (r)." Let us therefore put it to this issue. But then it is to be observed, that there is one capital mistake, which runs through all that this very in- genious and able writer, and others of the same sentiments, have advanced on this head; and that is, that they take it for granted, that whatever the Heathen moralists and phi- losophers have taught with regard to religion, or any part of duty, they discovered it merely by an effort of their own reason, without any light derived from Revelation at all. But this is impossible for them to prove. There is just ground to believe, as has been shewn, that the knowledge of the one true God, the Creator of the World, and of the main principles of religion and morality, were originally communicated by Divine Revelation to the first parents and ancestors of the human race, and from them transmitted to their descendants; some traces of which still continued, and were never utterly extinguished in the Heathen world. Besides which, the chief articles of moral duty were deli- vered and promulgated with a most amazing solemnity, by an express Divine Revelation, to a whole nation, and commit- ted to writing, before any of those philosophers, who are so much admired, published their moral discourses. And it is well known, that many of those great men travelled into countries bordering upon Judea, in order to gain knowledge, especially in matters of religion and morality. And those of that nation were pretty early spread abroad in several parts of the Pagan world. This learned author himself ac-

(r) Dr. Sykes's Principles and Connexion of Natural and Re- vealed Religion, p. 109.

7S Pretence that the Gospel Moral Duty was Part II.

knowledges, that the wisest men in Greece travelled into Egypt, that they might come at the knowledge of the unity of God; so that they did not attain merely by the force of their own unassisted reason, to the knowledge of that which he himself affirms to be the fundamental princi- ple of all morality (s). To which it may be added, that some of the most eminent of those philosophers were sen- sible of the great need they stood in of a Divine Assistance, to lead them into the right knowledge of religion and their duty, and frequently take notice of antient and venerable traditions, to which they refer, and which they suppose to have been of divine original.

But if we should grant that they had all, which they taught in relation to religion and morals, purely by their own reason, it is far from being true that there is not any any one evangelical precept, or point of moral duty, taught and enforced in the Gospel, that was not taught by the Hea- then philosophers. I shall at present only instance in one, which is of very great importance; it is that precept men- tioned by our Saviour, " Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." Matt. iv. 10. The philosophers were universally wrong, both in conforming themselves, and urging it as a duty upon the people to con- form in their religious worship, to the rites and laws of their several countries, by which polytheism was establish- ed, and the public worship was directed to a multiplicity of deities. This was a grand defect, and spread confusion and error 'through that part of duty which relates to the exer- cises of piety towards God, which some of the philosophers themselves acknowledged to be an essential branch of mo-

(5) Dr. Sykes's Principles and Connection of Natural and Revealed Religion, p. 383.

Chap. V. taught by the Philosophers examined. 79

rality. I shall have occasion afterwards, in the course of this work, to take notice of some other evangelical precepts which were not taught by the philosophers.

But, not to insist upon this at present, I would observe, that it cannot reasonably be pretended, that a complete sys- tem of morality, in its just extent, and without any mate- rial defect, is to be found in the writings of any one phi- losopher, or sect of philosophers. The utmost that can be alleged with any shew of reason is, that there is no one moral duty prescribed in the Gospel, but which may pos- sibly be found in the writings of some or other of the an- tient Pagan philosophers. But if this were so, what use or force could this be supposed to have with respect to the people, or the bulk of mankind? Must they be put to seek out their duty amidst the scattered volumes of philosophers and moralists, and to pick out, every man for himself, that which seemeth to him to be the best in each of them? Or, if any one philosopher should undertake to do it for the peo- ple, and select out of them all a system of morals, which in his opinion would be a complete rule of duty, upon what foundation could this pass for a code of laws, obligatory on all mankind, or even on any particular nation or person, un- less enforced by some superior authority? Mr. Locke has expressed this so happily, that I cannot give my sense of it better than in his words. Speaking of moral precepts, he saith, " Supposing they may be picked up here and there, some from Solon and Bias in Greece, others from Tally in Italy, and to complete the whole, let Confucius as far as China be consulted, and Anacharsis the Scythian contribute his share; what will all this do to give the world a complete morality, that may be to mankind the unqut-stionable rule of life and manners? Did the saying of Aristippus or Con- fucius give it an authority? Was Zeno a lawgivt-r to man- kind? If not, what he or any other philosopher delivered

80 The Sentiments of the Philosophers Part IL

was but a saying of his. Mankind might hearken to it or reject it as they pleased, or as suited their interests, pas- sions, inclinations, or humours, if they were under no obli- gation {t)y

Let us suppose that the lessons and instructions given by philosophers and moralists, with respect to any particular duty, appear to be fit and reasonable, this is not alone suffi- cient to give them a binding force. A thing may appear to be agreeable to reason, and yet there may be inducements and motives on the other side, which may keep the mind suspended, except there be an higher authority to turn the scale. The observation which Grotius applies to a particular case, holds of many others. That "that which has less utility is not merely for that reason unlawful: and it may happen that a more considerable utility may be opposed to that which we have in view, whatever we suppose it to be. — Neque enim quod minus utile est statim illicitum est, adde quod accidere potest; ut huic qualicunque utilitati alia ma- jor utilitas repugnet (m)." In matters of practice, a thing may seem to be reasonable, and yet cannot be proved to be certainly and necessarily obligatory. So much may be said in opposition to it, as may very much weaken the force of what was offered to recommend it: and a prevailing appe- tite or worldly interest has often a great influence on the mind, and hinders it from passing an impartial judgment. But a divine revelation, clearly ascertaining and determining our duty in those instances, in plain and express terms, and enforcing it by Divine Authority, and by sanctions of re- wards and punishments, would decide the point, and leave no room to doubt of the obligation. A noble author, speak-

(j) Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity, See his Works, vol. II. p. 533. edit. 3d.

(m) Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. ii. cap. 5. sect. 12.

Chap. V. were not Lazvs obligatory upon Mankind, 81

ing of the philosophers, saith, that " some few particular men may discover, explain, and press upon others the mo- ral obligations incumbent upon all, and our moral state be little improved {x)^ And therefore he lays the principal stress upon the institutions of civil laws and governments, and the various punishments which human justice inflicts to enforce those laws. But how little fitted those institutions are to enforce morality and virtue, taken in its true notion and proper extent, has been already shewn. The greatest men of antiquity seem to have been sensible, that neither bare reason and philosophy, nor a mere human authority, is sufficient to bind laws upon mankind. Accordingly, the last mentioned author, who was eminent for his political knowledge, has observed, that " the most celebrated philo- sophers and lawgivers did enforce their doctrines and laws by a Divine Authority, and call in an higher principle to the assistance of philosophy and bare reason. He instances in Zoroaster, Kostanes, the Magi, Minos, Numa, Pytha- goras, and all those who framed and formed religions and commonwealths, who made these pretensions, and passed for men divinely inspired and commissioned (?/)." And these pretensions, though not vouched by sufficient creden- tials, gave their laws and institutions a force with the peo- ple, which otherwise they would not have had. But as the several sects of philosophers in succeeding ages, among the Greeks and Romans, only stood upon the foot of their own reasoning, and could not pretend to a Divine Autho- rity, this ver}^ much weakened the effect of their moral les- sons and precepts. And, indeed, the best and wisest among them acknowledged on several occasions, the need they stood in of a Divine Revelation and Instruction. That the

{x) Bolinghroke's Works, Vol. V. p. 480.

(v) Ibid. p. 227.

Vol. II. L

$? The Sentiments of the Philosophers^ £s?c. Part IL

philosophers in general had no great weight with the people, appears from what is observed in the first volume of this work, chap. 10. To which it may be added, that Cicero, after having given the highest encomiums on philosophy, especially as the best guide in morals, adds, that " it is so far from being esteemed and praised, according to what it merits of human life, that it is by the mobt of mankind ne- glected, and by many even reproached. — Philosophia qui- dem tantum abest, ut proinde ac de hominum est vita me- rita, laudetur, ut a plerisque neglecta, a multis etiam vitu- peretur (2)."

(2) Tuscul. Disput. lib. v. cap. 2. p. 344. edit. Davis.

u

CHAPTER VI.

Many of the philosophers were fundamentally wrong in the first principles of morals. They denied that there are any moral differences of things founded in nature and reason, and resolved them wholly into human laws and customs. Observations on those philosophers who made man's chief good consist in plea- sure, and proposed this as the highest end of morals, without any regard to a Divine Law. The moral system of Epicurus considered. His high pretences to virtue examined. The inconsistency of his principles shewn, and that, if pursued to their genuine consequences, they are really destructive of all virtue and good morals.

JMORAL philosophy, properly speaking, had its beginning^ among the Greeks with Socrates. Cicero says, " he was the first that called down philosophy from heaven, and intro- duced it into cities and private houses, and obliged it to make life and manners the subject of its enquiries.— Primus philosophiam devocavit a coelo, et in urbibus coUocavit, et in domus etiam introduxit, et ccegit de vita et moribus, re-* busque bonis et malis quserere («)•" Not that he was the first philosopher that ever treated of morals, but, as the same great man elsewhere observes, Socrates was the first that, quitting abstruse disquisitions into natural things, and curious speculations about the heavenly bodies (which had principally employed all the philosophers before him) as being things too remote from our knowledge, or if known, of little use to direct men's conduct, brought philosophy into common life, and made virtues and vices, things good and evil, the only object of his philosophy (b). From his time the science of morals was cultivated. All the different

(a) Tuscul. Disput. lib. v. cap. 4, (6) Academic, lib, ir cap, 4.

84 Many of the Philosophers were wrong Part II.

sects of philosophers treated of morality, but they went upon very different principles.

Some of the philosophers were wrong in the very funda- mental principles of morals. And since the foundation was wrong, they could not build upon it a proper system, nor be depended upon for leading mankind into right notions of their duty. Such were those who maintained, that nothing is just or unjust by nature, but only by law and custom. This was the opinion, as Laertius informs us, of Theodorus, Archelaus, Aristippus, and others. This way also went Pyrrho, and all the sceptics, who denied that any thing is in itself, and by its own nature, honest or dishonest, base or honourable, but only by virtue of the laws and customs which have obtainLcl among men: for which they are de- servedly exposed by Epictetus (c). Plato represents it as a fashionable opinion, which very much prevailed in his time, and was maintained and propagated by many that were es- teemed wise men and philosophers, " That the things which are accounted just, are not so by nature: for that men are always differing about them, and making new constitutions: and as often as they are thus constituted they obtain autho- rity, being made just by art and by the laws, not by any natural force or virtue (^)."

Thus did many of the philosophers resolve all moral ob- ligations into merely human laws and constitutions, making them the only measure of right and wrong, of good and evil.

(c) Epictet. Dissert, lib. ii. cap. 20. sect 6. Our modern scep- tics, as well as the ancient, set themselves to shew the uncer- tainty of morals. Mr. Bayle has many passages which look that way. And this particularly is what the author of a late remark- able tract, intituled, Le Pyrrhonisme du Sage, has attempted to shew.

.{d) Plato de Leg. lib. x. Oper. p. 666. C. edit. Lugd.

Chap. VI. in the fundamental PrincijAes of Morals, 85

So that if the people had a mind to be instructed what they should do or forbear, they sent them to the laws of their several countries, and allowed them to do whatsoever was not forbidden by those laws. And in this those philosophers agreed with the politicians. When Alcibiades asked Peri- cles, What is law? he answered, That all those are laws which are prescribed with the consent and approbation of the people, declaring what things ought to be done, or ought not to be done: and intimated, that whatsoever things are appointed by legal authority, are to be regarded as good, and not evil (e). And indeed Socrates himself, and the most celebrated philosophers and moralists, though they acknow- ledged a real foundation in n'tture for the moral differences of things, yet every where inculcate it as a necessary ingre- dient in a good man's character, to obey without reserve the laws of his country. But what uncertain rules of morality the civil lav.s and constitutions are, and that they might often lead men into vicious and immoral prac- tices, sufficiently appears from what hath been already ob- served.

Some of the philoscphers, as Laertius tells us of Theo- dorus, declared, without disguise, that " a wise man might, upon a fit occasion, commit theft, adultery, and sacrilege, for that none of these things are base in their own nature, if that opinion concerning them be taken away, which was agreed upon for the sake of restraining fools." Tov <77r»5^/o»

ttta^^oq (pv(Tet, TKi l^r' ciVT<{ii ^d|jj5 «/go^8vjj?) ? O'vytcUTeci 'ivtKX rtii rat i(p^ovojv a-vfox.'Hi (f^» Aristippus, who also held that "nothing is by nature just, or honourable, or base, but by law and

(e) Xenoph. Memor. Socr. lib. i. cap. 2. sect. 42. (/) Diog. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 99.

86 The Morality of Epicurus considered. Part 11.

custom," yet is pleased to declare, that a prudent man will not do an absurd thing, «Sev etrovai\ any thing out of the common usage, because of the dangers it might bring upon him, and the censures it might expose him to (^). And hovV weak a tie this would be to a man that had nothing else to restrain him, I need not take pains to shew. It is evident that, upon this scheme of things, there can be no such thing as conscience, or a fixed notion of virtue. It opens a wide door to licentiousness, and to the perpetrating all manner of vice and wickedness without scruple, if they can but escape public notice, and the punishments of human judicatories. What fine instructors in morals v/ere those philosophers who taught such maxims!

Among those antient philosophers who were wrong in the fundamental principles of morals, they may be justly reckoned who laid this down as a foundation of their moral system, that a man's chief good consists in sensual pleasure, and that this is the supreme end he is to propose to him- self, to which every thing else should be subordinate. There is a remarkable passage of Cicero in his first book of laws relating to this subject, in which he represents pleasure as an enemy within us, " which being intimately complicat- ed with all the senses, lays all kinds of snares for our souls: that it hath a semblance of good or happiness, but is really the author of evils: and that being coiTupted by its blandish- ments, we do not sufficiently discern the things which are in their own nature good, because they want that sweetness and tickling or itching kind of sensation it affords. — Animis omnes tenduntur insidise ab e^, quse penitus omni sensu im- pljcata insidet imitatrix boni voluptas, malorum autem autor omnium, cujus blanditiis corrupti quse natura bona sunt.

(g) Diog, Laert. lib. ii. segm. 93.

Chap. VI. The Morality of Epicurus considered, gr

quia dulcedine hac et scabie carent, non cernimus satis (/i)." And again, speaking of those who stiffly maintained that pleasure is the greatest good,. he says, that." this seems to be rather the languages of beasts than of men: — quae quidem mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non hominum (?)." Aris-

{li) De Leg. lib. i. cap. 17.

(0 De Parad. cap. 1. Some of our modern admirers of reason differ very much from Cicero in their sentiments on this sub- ject. 1 he author of Les six Discours sur THomme, said to be written by the celebrated M. de Voltaire, who sets up for a zeal- ous advocate for natural rehgion, says, that " nature attentive to fulfil our desires, callelh us to God by the voice of plea- sures."

'* La nature attentive a remplir nos desirs, Nous rappelle au Dieu par le voix des plaisirs."

At this rate, men will be apt to regard all their inclinations and appetites, as the significations of the will of God concerning the the duties he requireth of them. This is also the prevailing max- im of the author of the famous book De TEsprit, who observes, that " since pleasure is the only object which men seek after, all that is necessary to inspire them with the love of viriue is to imitate nature. Pleasure pronounces what nature wills, and grief or pain shews what nature forbids, and man readily obeys it. The love of pleasure, against which men, more respectable for their probity than their judgment, have declaimed, is a rein, by which the passions of particular persons may be always directed to the general good. — Si le plaisir est I'lmique objet de la recherche des hommes, pour lui inspirer Pamour de la vertu, il ne faut qu* imiter la nature: le plaisir en annonce les volontes, le douleur les defenses; et Phomme lui obeVt avcc docilite. L'amour du plaisir contre lequel se sont eleves des gens d'une probiie plus respect- able qu' eclaircee, est un frein, avec lequel on peut toujours di- riger au bien general les passions des particulicrs."^De PKsprit, disc. 3. chap. 16. tome II. p. 67. Amst. And what kind oi plea- sure he intends, clearly appears from the latter end of the 13th chapter of his 3d discourse, where he says, that *' there are only

^ The Morality of Epicurus conaidered. Part 1 1.

tippus, and his followers of the Cyrenaic sect, taught this doctrine in the grossest sense, and without disguise. They held corporeal pleasure to be our ultimate end; that pleasure

two kinds of pleasures: the pleasures of the senses, and the means of obtaining them; which may be ranked among plea- sures; because the hope of pleasure is the beginning of plea- sure." And this is agreeable to the general scheme of his book, which goes upon this principle, that physical sensibi- lity is the source of all our ideas, and that man is not capable of any other motive to determine him than the pleasures of the senses: and these are all expressly reduced by him to love, the love of women. And he makes the perfection of legislation to consist in exciting men to the noblest actions, by fomenting and gratifying those sensual passions. He says, " If the pleasure of love be the most lively and vigorous of all human pleasures, what a fruitful source of courage is contained in this pleasure? and what ardor for virtue may not the love of women inspire?" Ibid, tome II. disc. 3. chap. 15. p. 51. And accordingly he pleads for gallantry in a nation where luxury is necessary, (and it is well known, that under the name of gallantry, especially in that na- tion to which this gentleman belongs, is comprehended an unlaw- ful commerce with married women). He thinks, " that it is not agreeable to policy to regard it as a vice in a moral sense: or, if they will call it a vice, it must be acknowledged that there are vices which are useful in certain ages and countries." And to to say that those vices are useful in certain countries, is, ac- cording to this scheme, to say, that in those countries they are .virtues: for he holds, that every action ought to be called virtu- ous, which is advantageous to the public. " C'est une inconse- quence politique que de regarder la galanterie, comme un vice moral: et si Ton veut lui conserver le nom de vice, il faut con- venir, qu*il en estd'utiles dans certains siecles, et certains pays." Ibid, tome I. disc. 2. chap. 15. p. 176. et seq.

The author of Le Discours sur la Vie Heureuse, printed at the end of Pensees Philosophiques, carries it still farther. The design of that whole treatise is to shew, that happiness consists only in sensiaal pleasure, and in the gratification of the fleshly

Chap. Vl. The Morality of Epicurus considered, 8$>

which actually moves and strikes the senses: and they round- ly affirmed, that the pleasures of the body are much better than those of the soul, and its pains and griefs much worse. See Laert. lib. ii. segm. 87. et 90. Epicurus, who held the same principle, that pleasure is the chief good and hit(hest end of man, endeavoured to explain it so as to shun the odious Gonsequences which are charged upon it. His morality was

appetite, and that wisdom consists in pursuing it. From this principle, that the actual pleasurable sensation of the body is the only true happiness, he draws conclusions worthy of such a principle: that '^ we ought to take care of the body before the soulj to cultivate the mind only with a view to procure more advantat^e^ for the body; to deny ourselves nothing that can give us plea- sure; to use nature (by which he means the bodily appetites) as a guide to reason.'* It is no wonder that he asserts, that '* the law of nature directs us to give up truth to the laws, rather than oui* bodies; and that it is naturaf to treat virtue in the same way as truth. — Ues lors il faut songer au corps, avant que de songerst Fame; ne cultiver son ame, que pOur procurer pius de commo-* dites a son corps; ne point se priver de ce que fait plaisir; don- ner a la raison la nature pour guide. La loi de la nature dicte de leur [\. e. aux loix des hommesj livrer plutot la verite que nos corps; il est naturel de traiter la vertu comme de la verite.**' Such is the morality taught by some of our pretended masters of reason in the present age, who are too wise to be guided by revelation, and express a contempt for those as weak and super-* stitious persons, who are for governing themselves by its sacred rules. It can hardly be thought too severe a censure to say, that the principal reason for their endeavouring to discard the Gospel is, that they may be free from the restraint it lays Upon their sen- sual and depraved passions, and that they may be left loose in matters of morality, to follow their own inclinations, and to do whatsoever their appetites would prompt them to. ^

* Discours sur la Vie Heureuse, a Potsdam 1748. p. 34. See L'Abbe Gauchet Lettres Critiques, torn. i. lettre iv.

Vol. il M

90 The Morality of Epicurus considered. Part II.

highly extolled by some of the antients, and has had very learned apologists among the moderns, some of whom have not scrupled to prefer it to any other of the heathen philoso- phers. It is necessary, therefore, in considering the systems of the Pagan moralists, to take particular notice of that of Epicurus, that we may see whether it deserves the enco- miums which have been so liberally bestowed upon it. And I cannot help thinking, that, whatever plausible appearance it may put on, yet if we take the whole of his scheme to- gether, and impartially consider it in its proper connection and natural consequences, we shall find it destructive of true virtue.

It is evident that there is one essential defect which runs through his whole system of morality, and that is, that it had no regard to the Deity, or to a Divine Authority or Law: the gods he owns (for he does not speak of one Su- preme God) were such as lived at ease, and without care, in the extra-mundane spaces, and exercised no inspection over mankind, nor ever concerned themselves about their actions and affairs. There was therefore no room upon his scheme foi thi: exercise of piety towards God, a submission lo his aut'n.' rity, and resignation to his will, or for a dependance upon Providence, and a religious regard to the Divine fa- vour and Jipprobation. It is true, that Epicurus writ books about piety and sanctity (i), for which he is deservedly ridiculed by Cotta in Cicero (/). And Epictetus ob-

(A-) Laert. lib. x. segm. 27.

(/) De nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. 41. It is a little surprising, that so great a man as Gassendus, among the many fine things he says of Epicurus, has thought fit to mention his disinterested piety, and fili?l affection towards the Divine Nature. What he offers on this hrad is extremely weak, and is a remarkable in- stance of what may be often observed, that when learned men

Chap. IV. The Morality of Epicurus considered. 91

serves concerning the Epicureans, that " they got them- selves m ide priests and prophets of gods, which according to them, had no existence, and consulted the Pythian priest- ess, only to hear what in their opinion were falsehoods, and interpreted those oracles to others." This he treats as a monstrous impudent imposture (w).

As to that part of morality which relates to the duties we owe to mankind, in this also the scheme of Epicurus, at least if pursued to its genuine consequences, was greatly defective. He taught, that a man is to do every thing for his own sake: that he is to make his own happiness his chief end, and to do all in his power to secure and preserve it. And he makes happiness to consist in the mind's being freed from trouble, and the body from^ pain. Accordingly, it is one of his maxims, that ** business and cares do not consist with happiness.*'— 'Oy 0'vfA<Pa>vS(ri Treaty f*xrt7ett }^ (p^ovTihg (nxKcc^toTUTt (n). According to